



MAGNUM OPUS: CITRINITAS

Module 5: Anima and Animus Contemporary

QUOTE

Woman is compensated by a masculine element and therefore her unconscious has, so to speak, a masculine imprint. This results in a considerable psychological difference between men and women, and accordingly I have called the projection-making factor in women the animus, which means mind or spirit.

The Syzygy: Anima and Animus, Collected Works, 9ii, par. 28f.

Anima and Animus Contemporary

Compiled by The Centre for Applied Jungian Studies

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Transcript

We are talking about the anima and animus. There are some problems with Jung's idea of the anima and animus. There're some serious problems with it. And the predominant problem is that it assumes gender essentialism. It seems as if Jung held the following hypothesis to be true - that essentially female psychology and male psychology are different.

And his notion of the soul – of the character of the soul – is different for women than it is for men; and this is based on his theory of opposites, so the idea is – that if the persona has a particular form – has a particular explicit form – then the unconscious has the opposite implicit form. On the assumption that men are masculine and that they are rational, thinking creatures, and hunters, and doers, etc. etc. their feeling function is ... their anima really, is their feeling function and it compensates their explicit personality which is masculine.

And the inverse for women. Women are more in touch with their feeling life, maybe she's more creative, maybe she has better aesthetic sense, maybe she's more intuitive etc. but when it comes to thinking it's probably best if she leaves the thinking to her husband; maybe her thinking has not been developed all that well, then her animus is her soul; her thinking function is in the unconscious; it's latent - a bit primitive – but it kind of compensates her conscious – to say “inadequacies”, sounds a bit nasty, but what I mean is– it compensates her conscious way of being in the world.

Now, I don't want to say too much about it, but I think that's a major problem. I think it may even have been a problem in Jung's time. I mean, the excuse that's always made is that he was "a man of his time" and at that time, (presumably) men were masculine and women were feminine, and the gender roles were very clear. But I wonder if that really is consonant. I mean he didn't live all that long ago, and even, I mean surely – have genders really changed that much? I think gender identity *has* changed in the world, but for someone who was a doctor of the soul there's something questionable about that idea that he came up with.

But in any case, even if it was valid in those days, it's definitely a problem today because the truth is that gender identity, is clearly not so not that simple. You have women who display what traditionally we would call masculine behaviours; and you have men who display what traditionally we would refer to as feminine behaviours; and the incidence of androgyny in both genders is much higher; and the expectations of society, even on particular gender roles, are not – I mean they are still there, but they are not quite as, maybe - as pervasive or as conditioning as they were a while ago – maybe a hundred years ago or so, certainly in the Western world anyway.

What we see then is that in contemporary society is that – both men and women display feminine – or what traditionally we would call feminine – and masculine capacities and characteristics. And, in the realm of thinking – I read a few years ago that, certainly in the U.K. and the States -, women are starting to eclipse men. More and more women are going to university, and more and

more women are graduating from university, that realm that was clearly demarcated as being the masculine thinking role doesn't seem to be quite as clearly demarcated anymore. Women are making some good progress there. The women's movement has made some strides in the last hundred years or so.

There are some problems, I think, with this essentialism. Nevertheless, and this is something that I think a lot of Jungians secretly – especially, traditional classical analysts, but they secretly - they have to play - the politically correct game, and they go, “Yes, of course, there's no essentialism”, and, “Yes, of course, we know that - men and women are fundamentally the same, blah-blah-blah”, but then, actually they know that they're not the same and that the application of the anima and animus is very effective when it actually comes to therapy and actually utilising the concepts because, despite all of these gender identity changes, and moves, and what have you, of course in many situations you do still tend to have women playing feminine roles and men playing masculine roles, and it does still seem to have some very useful practical application, despite the fact that it is very politically incorrect and theoretically dubious whether this hypothesis really holds.

I have decided to re-write the Collective Works, and I'm going to (well, I thought I needed a project) and I thought I'd try and bring Jung into the twenty-first century, poor guy, and he died a while ago; about sixty years ago. I thought I'd try and bring him into the twenty-first century, and see if we can think about the anima and animus in a way that is maybe less gender ... that

doesn't have the gender essentialism. This is a work that a lot of the post Jungians have worked on; trying to see how these ideas – how, Jung's ideas of anima and animus that really are a very valuable part of his work - can be utilised within what we now know from contemporary gender studies.

That's just to frame what I'm going to say. I'm taking a very non-classical and maybe non-typical – I'm not quite sure what the typical is nowadays, but I'm going to talk about this in a different way from the way Jung spoke about it in his work. What I'm trying to do here is to take what I think is the most valuable aspect of the anima and animus and look at how we can use it and utilise it without it being gender specific. That's not an original idea, despite what I said; it is an idea that I think, a number of contemporary Jungians are working with, and that seems to be a good way to work with the idea. In other words what we can say is that the anima and animus describe certain ways of being in the world; certain functions, and those functions can be present in both men and women. And we don't need to say that women have an animus and men have an anima, but that we both have access to both of these functions; both genders have access to both of these functions. And that's the way that I intend the lecture that I'm going to give you now.

What I want to talk about then is the anima and animus, as rational and irrational functions, not being related to gender at all, so I'm going to try and drop gender from the entire conversation. I want to talk about it as rational and irrational functions: the animus as describing the rational thinking

function, and the anima as describing the irrational feeling function.¹ Another way you can think about it, I guess, is that when we talk about animus, I think that animus is principally concerned with the objective outer truth, and anima is principally concerned with the subjective inner truth.

Now, just to make a point here, right at the start; let me make this point that I talk about animus as rational thinking function and anima as irrational feeling function. That's not to suggest that the presence of thinking or feeling is functional; in other words, what I mean to say is that one can use one's thinking function or one's feeling function, very badly. It's not to suggest that when we talk about animus that we're talking about rationality and when we talk about anima that we're talking about feeling in its purest and its most constructive sense. It can be very bad thinking, and it can be very bad feeling as well. It's just that we're talking about those functions. It's split then; rational and irrational; thinking and feeling; objective and subjective; outer and inner, and – I'm not a hundred per cent sure about this, but I thought that - this idea that the animus describes structure or form and maybe the anima describes flow or energy.

When we talk about the rational function, we are talking about ... when I talk about rational evaluation, what I'm talking about is the application of quantitative evaluation rather than qualitative. We talk about quantitative,

¹ Even this description of thinking as rational and feeling as irrational is a non-traditional framing. Jung classified both thinking and feeling as rational functions in his typology. He does this to differentiate them from the irrational functions of sensation and intuition. Whilst I appreciate his using this classification, for my purposes, and the purposes of this alternate framing of anima/animus, I will characterise feeling as essentially irrational. I do this for the purpose of clearly distinguishing it from rational thinking.

logical, factual, analytical, enumerative and scientific categorisation. The animus then, is concerned with the scientific method as we traditionally understand it; it is concerned with the application of rationality; logical, analytical, factual, quantitative, analysis. And I think a key idea is the idea of enumeration, so number plays a significant role in the rational, evaluative function.

And then against that, we can talk about the anima as being irrational evaluation; qualitative, and we're talking about irrational or non-rational value assignment. Being able to assign value or disvalue in a non-rational sense; aesthetic value – beauty, emotional sensitivity; the issue of meaning and of care. Let me try to unpack that a bit. In Jung's typology – not to confuse matters, but just to make this point, in Jung's typology – generally, thinking and feeling are both considered rational functions, and sensation and intuition are both considered irrational functions. But I want to draw a line between thinking as being rational, and feeling as being irrational, and I think it's a useful distinction.

What I'm saying, in other words, is that when I ask you how you feel and you answer that question in an authentic, honest and sincere fashion, that you do not call on your rational faculty to justify your answer. If I say to you, "Do you feel good?", "Do you love this person?", "Do you like this painting?", "Do you like this museum?", "Do you care about this person?" that an answer comes to you – if you're using your feeling function, an answer comes to you – which doesn't require rational justification; you simply answer what you feel. You

may be called on to justify why you feel the way you do, and if you're called on to justify why you feel the way you do, then you recruit your rational function; you start to say, "Well, this particular artist comes from this period, and this is a very good example of his work, and if you look at the way the light falls on it, etc. etc." you may start to bring in some rationalisation of, to justify or to ... well, to justify your claim that you like this work of art. But initially, the feeling itself is purely – is - a spontaneous, wholly non-rational function.

"Irrational", in that sense, is not meant to imply that it ... it's not irrational in the sense that it overthrows rationality or that it goes against rationality; I mean irrational in the sense that doesn't utilise the rational function; it's non-rational, or , maybe one would say it's "a-rational", in that sense; it doesn't utilise the rational function. When we talk about irrational value, and disvalue, if I had to ask you the question, "Which of your friends do you care for the most?" Maybe, if you were to use the rational function, you would say something along the lines of - I mean, that's obviously a loaded question, but maybe you would say something along the lines of, "Well, I care for Jimmy the most because he gives me the most attention; I think he's an amazing person because of everything that he's gone through, and his personal journey, and he has a wonderful sensitivity about him, and I think he's a very good conversationalist, etc.". If I answered a question in that sense then I'm utilising the rational function; I'm kind of utilising the scientific method; I'm saying these are the reasons why I rank Jimmy as my number one friend; I'm justifying it rationally. Let's leave aside whether I'm right or wrong, but I'm looking for reasons.

On the other hand, if I ask you a question and I say, “Well which of your friends do you care for the most?” I think that a feeling arises in you that just says, “Well, I care for this person most.” There’s a feeling of caring. Now maybe the person you care for most is an unlikely candidate, it’s someone who is not particularly nice; maybe they’re not a particularly good conversationalist, not very sensitive, not very evolved – quite primitive, they might be kind of an irrational choice. But nevertheless, your feeling towards them is one of caring; of, “This is the person that I value.”; “This is the person that I would want to spend time with”. Maybe it goes to that question, I might say to you, “Who *should* you spend time with?” And if you say, “Well, the person I *should* spend time with will be the person that one could rationally justify one’s choice.

But the question, “Who do you *want* to spend your time with?” is an irrational; it’s a feeling; it’s what you want. It doesn’t utilise the rational capacity, and that’s the distinction that I’m trying to draw for you here. When we talk about non-rational value, or disvalue, it’s not something that you are rationally justifying. You may be able to rationally justify it if called upon to do so, but the capacity that I’m talking about is the capacity that says, “I like this person.” Why do you like them? “I’ve got no idea.” Or, “I don’t like this person.” Why don’t you like them? “I don’t know; I just don’t.” It’s just that feeling. You cannot explain why you feel the way you do, you simply feel that way.

And then I think when it comes to something like aesthetics, I mean, maybe there is something, maybe, that will, ... in terms of art, there is ..., if one studies art; if one is an interior designer; if one makes a profession out of trying to

understand the difference between what is beautiful and what isn't beautiful, maybe one brings in some justificatory apparatus. But I think the appreciation of beauty in its pure form is irrational. Something strikes you as being beautiful or being ugly and it doesn't ... once again, I don't think it utilises the rational function in order to justify what it provokes in you; you simply find it attractive. You're walking through the art gallery; which painting do you like? I like this painting. Why do you like this painting? I don't know, but this particular painting I'm drawn to; this particular painting moves me in some sense; this particular painting, I find meaningful. I've got no idea why.

Now maybe an art expert or an artist, or someone – like ... I'm thinking of someone like Cyril² – would be able to try and explain, or justify, or select, one particular painting above another painting, for rational reasons, but the aesthetic sense in its pure form doesn't utilise that rationality; it's a pure sense.

Care; "What do you care for?"; "How much do you care for this thing or this person?" is assigning a value.

Emotional sensitivity; what I mean by saying that is that I think emotions are wholly irrational. Emotions, to me, are kind of antithetical to rationality, and I often find it very strange that Jung talks about the feeling function as a rational function, but anyway, so I think that when I'm dealing with my emotions whether it's an emotion of love, of anger, of jealousy, of longing, of happiness; sadness; melancholy, whatever it is, those emotions, once again, are non-

² Cyril Coetzee, a renowned South African artist and art historian.

rational. The question is not “*Why* do you feel the way you feel?” the question I’m asking is, “*How* do you feel?” “I feel sad.” Or, “I feel happy.” Or, “I feel joy.” The rationalisation is an attempt to justify what it is that I feel, or to explain what it is that I feel, but the feeling itself is non-rational.

And then, meaning; the issue of meaning. Meaning is an important one; I’m spending a lot of time here with the irrational, more than with the rational; that’s a good Jungian thing to do, of course: - be far more concerned with the irrational than the rational. But the rational function, to give it its rightful place – I don’t mean to suggest here that ... to denigrate reason, that’s not my purpose. I think that reason - is a critical and valuable human function and for the most part, civilisation is built on its shoulders, so science, philosophy, maybe not politics but a lot of the elements that make this world what it is are there in virtue of the fact that we are rational creatures, and we are able to use our minds in a way that non-rational creatures are not. Rationality is rightfully held up, I think, as being a supreme achievement of mankind. I’m not trying to denigrate rationality; I’m just trying to point out the contrast.

But when it comes to something like meaning, for example; meaning is irrational. If you go to the psychoanalyst, and you say to the psychoanalyst, “I feel kind of depressed and I feel as if my life is a bit meaningless” and then the psychoanalyst says, “Well let’s just have a look at your life; you are ... you have a wonderful job, you have a wonderful marriage, you have wonderful children, you are beautiful, you have all these qualifications, you’re very privileged, etc. etc. etc.” You don’t, strangely enough, feel that much better; you still feel shit,

you go “Oh, that’s true; it’s so true.” You maybe feel even worse then, because you say, “God! Not only am I depressed, but look how ungrateful I am. I’ve got all these things that should make my life meaningful and yet I still feel that my life is somehow empty”. It just adds guilt on top of everything else. A rational analysis; reasons, in that sense, are not what generate meaning.

Meaning seems to be in the province of the anima and of the feeling function. Some things are more meaningful for me than others, and what is meaningful to me is not necessarily the same as what is meaningful to you. You may find certain experiences – I’ve been thinking of Karen; Karen would be a nice example in terms of the swimming and being in the water, and Karen’s relationship with water, is a profoundly meaningful experience for her. Others would probably not feel the same way, and what is meaningful to us would not be meaningful to her. It’s not rational; it’s not something that can be justified. It is simply something that arises in you.

That’s the first categorisation, that I wanted to make and point out, is this distinction between the rational and irrational functions, and what we are talking about when we make the split between rational and irrational.

Before I go on, are there any questions on that?

There’s obviously some kind of a link between the two; they’re not-they’re not – separate. In other words, the thinking affecting feeling, and vice versa. Isn’t it? Or are they completely stand-alone ...?

No. No, I think ... you're right, of course. Absolutely. They do affect each other; the feeling affects the thinking and the thinking affects the feeling. And, I think they are ... yes, I think they're not stand-alone, they are intertwined. And maybe, in a sense, what we are doing in this exercise is slightly artificial because we are pulling them apart so we can look at them separately, but yes, they do live in us together, and they communicate ... And maybe it would be difficult to say where the one stops and the other one starts, but still, I do think we have a sense of their domains of operation. But yes, I do think they are in an interactive relationship with each other.

Because as I think of something, I can see how that can generate a feeling.

(Yes) And the other way around; if I feel something, that ...

Yes. A thought can lead to a feeling and a feeling can lead to a thought. Yes. Sure. Absolutely.

Aren't feelings literally things we feel in our body? And as you were talking about the anima I was thinking, most of it is almost physical, and there're no real words for it; you can give it words and become rational but it's this kind of physical ... it feels – or it seems – physical.

I think that it would be true to say that – that – an anima would include the body so that the anima ... , when we talk about the anima we are talking about the body, and we are talking about physicality, and we are talking about what one feels, physically. And I know that a lot of therapy – a lot of psychotherapy proceeds along the route of somatic therapy and the location of the feeling in the body. I mean, I think, even this exercise we did last week; I think one of

the questions I asked is “Where is it in your body; where do you feel it in your body?”

But it’s more than just the physical. It’s a bit like ... one talks about heartache, maybe. I feel heartache; I feel heart break, and often when I say that, I mean I do really feel ... (*Heaviness; heaviness.*) I do feel heaviness, and I do feel like ... I mean I don’t – but I do think the idea of actually feeling the chest tight or heart sore is part of the feeling. Or maybe I say, (*Experiencing*), or that thing of, “Trust your gut”, so one gets a feeling in one’s guts in terms of an intuition or whatever.

But at the same time it seems as if the feeling extends beyond the pure ... my sense, for example, is that I feel far more acutely than the cat does. Maybe I’m wrong, but I would imagine that physically we’re probably not all that different; she has physical sensations and I have physical sensations, but my sense is that the feelings live in me – in my spirit, if you want – in a far more profound sense than they do for her. I have the sense that feeling does have a physical dimension to it; I agree with you, but I think that, that is maybe a part of the overall rather than the complete.

I think it’s what you were saying about meaning, and I think Joseph Campbell writes about how we’re no longer in quest for meaning but for experiencing. , and I think that’s what you’re saying, that it’s much bigger than just pure physical location of the emotion (Yes); it’s the meaning and the experiencing (Yes) that makes it more vast.

Well, I was just talking about feelings there, but yes, I mean when you bring in meaning and experience, that as well. Sure.

I have a question: where do you feel it in the body?

That feeling in the body; is that not more “sensing”? I mean the word.

Maybe it is, but that idea, that a feeling does have a ... one can typically - if one has some somatic sensitivity one is typically able to locate the feeling in the body. There seems to be a relationship then, between the feeling and the body; maybe a closer relationship than between thinking and the body. But I don't want to get stuck on the body thing because it's going to lead us down the wrong path. I mean, yes, it does have a physical dimension, but really it's the feeling in its full sense that I'd like us to think about, not only in its kind of somatic sense.

I'm just disappointed that the anima and animus have been reduced to rational evaluation and irrational evaluation. I've always had a much more romantic idea of the anima being the female aspect of the male, and the animus being the male aspect of the female. I mean, when we've discussed dream talk, you talk about female images for men being the female aspect of the soul, and for women, the male in the dream is the male aspect of the soul. And surely that – that ... is that female-male thing not ... why would we look at rational evaluation or irrational evaluation which are purely thought things? Why give them the character of anima and animus, if the anima and animus don't mean something much more than that? We're kind of symbolising rational and

irrational thought with anima and animus, but isn't the anima-animus something more than that?

That's a big question and I think if I said, "no" it would be a very cavalier answer, because yes, maybe to talk about the rational and irrational function is not to ... maybe there are other aspects to anima / animus that are left out of that conversation. I'm framing it in terms of rational / irrational, but I wouldn't want to say that, that is all that needs to be said on the anima and animus. I think you're right, that there is a depth to the idea of the anima / animus, and there are different ways of approaching the topic. So much has been written on the anima and animus, and the imagery that you're speaking about - the dream imagery; the fantasy imagery – that is closely tied up with gender identity; is very much part of the anima / animus discussion. Maybe I'm using anima / animus in a very convenient sense; I'm using it as a springboard, which kind of suits my purposes to talk about rationality and irrationality. But I would concede that, that's a bigger conversation and it's a bigger idea than that. I'm just really ... it's convenient for me to ... because I suppose what I'm really trying to talk about is rationality and irrationality, and I'm kind of giving it a Jungian frame by talking about it as anima and animus. But I am drawing on some of Jung's theories and I will draw on it more as we go, in terms of talking about those functions.

I'm going to go on a little bit more.

Will you say something about the animus ridden woman and the anima possessed man?

Yes, yes. I will; I will say something about it. Let me just see ... can I go on a little further and then I'll talk a bit about that? Let me just unpack this idea a little more and then we'll talk about that.

Just to round it off then; so these are the questions I think then, that are animus ... that one can categorise into animus and anima. Animus would be, "How does this work?", "Where does this originate?" and, "How do we construct this?" Questions that are best addressed through the application of the rational function and of the scientific – kind of a scientific – consciousness.

Whereas, the questions for the anima would be, maybe, questions along the lines of, "Is this important?", "How do I feel about this?" and "Should we build it?" maybe. Not just *how* we build it but *should* we build it. Questions related to value.

Alright, let me address Welma's question and then I'll say a little bit about the anima animus in myth, as well. I just wanted to make this point about rational-irrational; I just wanted to complete that point.

Jung's idea is that if the function is conscious, it works better than if it is unconscious. If thinking is my dominant function and I operate in the thinking mode, that typically, thinking would be better developed than if I were operating in the feeling mode. If thinking is my dominant function, and thinking is the function that I bring to bear on most situations, generally, my thinking will be become civilised; it will become educated; it will evolve; it will adapt to the reality principle. But conversely then, my feeling - that is not as

well developed - may be very charged; it may be full of life and energy, but it is ... it's kind of infantile; it's underdeveloped; it's primitive.

I mean, going to this idea of the anima possessed man. The idea of the anima possessed man is that there's this man who is a natural thinker; he uses thinking; he's a ... maybe he works in industry, or he works in academia, or he's got some role where he's called on to utilise his thinking function. And he's very clever; he knows a lot of things; he can rationally explain and justify and hold court on various topics whatever his field of expertise may be. And he may have opinions about politics, and he may have opinions about society, and he may have opinions about a good many things, actually. But yet, his feeling is under-developed, he finds himself prone to moods; he finds himself (*irritated*), irritated; irritable; easily irritated; (*infantile*) infantile, his feelings are childish; he's not able to hold the relationship with feeling, in a very mature, well developed, sophisticated sense; his feelings are primitive; they're under-developed. He can be provoked; he can be ... he can sulk; he can fall into a depression; he's given to mood swings, because the feeling function, his anima function is unconscious. And as a consequence of being unconscious it's under-developed. And his feeling life is not that it doesn't live in him, it does live in him, but it lives in him in such a way that it possesses him in the way that the unconscious possesses one. He doesn't have the relationship with his feeling function that he does with his thinking function; he's unable to correct it.

Well Stephen, maybe on the other hand somebody that cannot express feelings; so contrary to what you're describing where you have all those kind of feelings,, running wild maybe (Yes); maybe there's another that is not able to actually give voice, or express feelings.

Yes, yes, I think that would be true; yes, one could say, yes, the inability to access his feelings; his inability to bring his feelings to bear on a certain situation, would all seem to indicate a complete disconnect from his feeling life. But yet, maybe in certain situations those feelings could overwhelm him, I think the way it typically works is that even if I'm emotionally very distant, and I'm very disconnected from my feelings, and I'm unable to bring my feelings to bear in my relationships and in my life etc., that sometimes those feelings, nevertheless, could erupt; and they could erupt in quite a destructive way or quite a complete over-reaction to what would be a more moderated, a more kind of evolved ...

What would we call that someone whose anima possessed us? Wouldn't that be someone who's void of the anima?

I think typically when we talk about anima possession it's the idea of the feeling functions, that are primitive; that do possess the subject. But I think what Gabe was bringing up would be ... maybe possessed wouldn't be the right word, but one would still say that the anima is unconscious, and that there's a 'disconnect' between the conscious and the unconscious, and that the man doesn't have a relationship with his feelings, I'm sure.

So the converse is true as well; what would you call it? Animus ridden.

The converse would be the idea that a woman – I mean, just because we’re putting it in gender terms, but so the idea of a woman, whose feeling functions are highly developed, she has sensitivity; she’s in touch with her feelings; she knows what she values; she knows what she cares about; she has emotional sensitivity; she’s able to nurture, to hold, to care etc. and she’s in touch with her feelings and she’s sensitive to the feelings of others, may find herself in a situation where her thinking function is not developed to the same degree, and her thinking may be fraught with a lot of very poorly thought out assumptions, and opinions, and paradigms.

She may find herself subject to certain ideas that she’s taken on board; certain opinions; certain beliefs that have not been arrived at in the way that the man who is a thinker arrived at them. They haven’t been tested, and tried, and tested, and evaluated, and haven’t evolved through a process of critical evaluation; they’ve just been taken on board. And she ... her thinking function kind of rides rough shod over her. She has certain ideas; she has certain opinions; she has certain beliefs that she holds onto, like a dogma; it’s like a religion. She just has these ideas; she’s got no idea where these ideas came from, but nevertheless these ideas tell her what is true and what is false. And of course, just taken one step further, the idea of the animus hound is the woman who not only has these very poorly developed ideas, but then insists on sharing it with you and telling you how things should be etc. has the

conviction that she knows the right way. That's of course, the idea of the animus hound.

It's like these soaps that you see, (Yes) and I think it's made up of this kind of material.

Oh, are these Soap Operas you're talking about?

These five o'clock soaps.

Yes, yes. That's right. Anima and animus are having a field day there.

There's a lot to say about it; there's a lot to say about it mythologically, but I'm just aware of the time; I don't want to go on too long because I want to talk about the applications, but let me say this then, in terms of ... Jung and a number of Jungians had made extensive use of looking at the role of the anima and animus in mythology – maybe notable in that respect is Marie Louise von Franz – and looking at some archetypal roles that the anima and animus play. And the idea is that what one sees mythologically is that one sees the role of the feminine principle of the anima where it is destructive, and one sees the destructive kind of life, sucking life away type of feminine. And then one sees the positive, nurturing feminine.

One doesn't have to think too hard to kind of ... obviously the evil stepmother, (*Medusa*) Medusa would be quite an extreme one, but like, the evil stepmother, the witch - the Baba yaga type of character -, the evil queen etc., is maybe the idea of the feminine principle where power becomes its overriding motivation and its overriding principle, rather than relatedness; it

loses touch with its relatedness and it becomes animated by the (*The black queen or the white queen*) ... the black queen or the white queen. The black queen: you get the idea of the anima that has been possessed by the power principle.

But then also, I mean, one finds other difficult feminine characters in mythology, for example, the ... the seductress, the ... the kind of, the manipulative feminine ... the what? (*The Femme Fatal*) the femme fatal. But the femme fatal ... because I don't think femme fatal in principle is a negative; it's the femme fatal that is motivated by, maybe, some malevolent (*Black widow spiders*) ; or there's some untoward intention.

And then against that the idea of the pure feminine that is loving, and nurturing, and holds, and promotes life. I mean, often portrayed in fairy tales of course, by either the good mother or young princess. And then with the animus ... the animus figure; the destructive animus, is often related to the animus that is also ... that has also lost touch with its relatedness; is overwhelmed by the power principle; is out of touch with what is going on, it's the animus that ... it's the king, the old king who has been misguided or has come to hold some opinions that are, not valid, and he makes the country sick; he makes the land sick; he makes the people sick, by ruling in a misguided fashion.

And often the archetypal idea of the pathological animus, or the kind of the evil animus or the misguided animus that traps the feminine. (Bluebeard) Bluebeard is the archetypal ... so he kind of holds the feminine hostage. And

that idea really did a lot of work on that idea, particularly that idea that the animus function, when it is not working in the feminine psyche, holds her hostage; it tells her things about herself; it gives her information about herself, that is not valid; that is somehow corrupt, and it holds her; it imprisons her; it prevents her from being in meaningful relatedness to others. It's often this idea of holding and imprisoning. Maybe that's enough about mythologically – there's a huge amount that can be said but - I don't want to say too much about it really.

Are there any questions on that before I talk about the application – or the applications?

Stephen, we discussed that emotional intelligence and I just wonder if that's maybe then, the balance, that you were talking about between the rational and irrational, I don't know if you can say anything about that.

Sure. I think that emotional intelligence is not the pathway between the two; I think that emotional intelligence refers to the anima function, properly. The idea of emotional intelligence is just, the idea of the anima; the feeling function, that is in fact functional, and it is properly located, and contextualised, and it's working, as opposed to the typical IQ test that is maybe testing the rational function. You might say that the idea of emotional intelligence is the idea of testing the irrational, feeling function, rather than being a bridge.

There's a shift now towards relationship intelligence which is more about the relatedness between the two and how the two form a consistent relationship

intelligence; it's more like a system and it includes the mind and (and the feeling) the animus anima.

And the feeling; yes.

It's a new thing.

... new thing. Alright.

I think they put in intelligence and everything.

... and everything, . But that's quite nice, because maybe looking at how these two can be related to each other.

Relationship system

It's interesting that the word "intelligence" relates more to rational.

Yes. But that's why I think, like, its appropriation by emotional intelligence is quite nice because it takes it out of the realm of the rational.

Just one more thing, before we talk about applications; just some pitfalls that I want to talk about - is - for the anima; just the typical pitfalls for the anima. Uncontained feeling, that is undirected, uncontained; that is overwhelming or it doesn't have a home; doesn't have a place to be contained; be held, is an anima issue. Issues often around the body – coming back to the body –body-issues often seem to be related to ... it does seem as if we're going to follow Jung's model, that- the body does fall under the anima and body issues do seem to be related to anima. And just generally, depression; loss of energy; melancholy, are all signs of the anima not functioning optimally.

And pitfalls for the animus would be excessive rationalisation; the idea that the world is wholly rational and that through the application of my rational capacity I can understand everything and I can overcome every problem, and, if I just think about it hard enough then it will submit itself to some rational analysis. Very bad rationality is another animus problem, rationality - but very poor rationality, I have ideas, but very poorly thought out ideas; inflated belief in the principle of rationality.

I've got one more, if I could read it.

Oh! Thinking, that is paradigmatically constrained. Oh God! Do I really want to talk about that? I'll say something very briefly about it. One of the pitfalls of rationality is that I ... sometimes I buy into a particular rational system; I come to the idea that the world works in this particular way; I've got a particular rational model that I use to analyse the world. And then I am constrained by that model, I try to fit everything into the frame; into this particular rational frame. I use this rational evaluative tool to understand everything that I encounter, and the kind of absolute conviction and belief in it then, naturally closes me off from new learning, and new experiences, and other ways of evaluating. I become locked in a particular paradigm. And I think it's alright if you do business a lot, of course, but this idea that one needs to think out of the box, but it's not only in business that one thinks in the box; in life we often think in the box as well. So "in the box" thinking is being locked into a particular rational paradigm.

I want to go on to applications. Before - sorry, I'm running out of energy myself a little bit – before I do, are there any questions on the ... on what I've covered so far? Please do ask if you have any questions on the material that I've covered; before we go and talk about the applications. Nothing? Everyone happy? Everyone's probably just tired, but anyway.

Happy with every word.

I'd like you to think about, in terms of the applications³ - I will post this on Facebook for you as well, but let's just go through it briefly; I'd like you to think about –which is your dominant function? Is it thinking or feeling? I've got a few questions that maybe can guide you in that sense. In terms of an imaginative exercise, I'd like you to think about who your ideal thinker, and your ideal feeler are.

Is it two things or one thing?

Two things; two people, I'd like you to think about, in terms of the people that you've encountered in the world, whether they are people you actually met or whether they are people that you've come across through literature, or the arts, or whatever, but who do you think the ideal thinker is for you, and who's the ideal feeler? And I think that just in terms of getting an image for each of them is useful.

³ The conversation that follows is best read after looking at the actual applications, which follow this transcript. As will be apparent the questions the students asked were with the benefit of seeing the actual applications that follow this transcript.

Then taking it a step further, in terms of animus applications, I would like you to think about three significant beliefs about the world; that you hold to be true about the world, and that govern the way you relate to the world. And I would like you to think about where they come from; how objective they are, or not, and the impact they have on your life.

Is that clear? Do you understand what I'm asking for there?

Won't you explain aetiology again?

Aetiology; just origin; where it comes from.

And objectivity?

Objectivity; you have come to hold a particular belief, but does it seem to be a belief that is widely held, or do you think it is a ... if you think about it, is it a very realistic kind of belief? Does it ... is it just something that you've come to believe – you've come to hold a particular opinion – or does it seem to be objectively true? Is it a kind of a shared belief? What is your justification for it? And do you think the justification is valid, or is it questionable? Try to apply the reality principle, I've come to believe this, but does this belief seem to be valid in the greater scheme of things? And the impact; what is the impact of it in your life and in the world?

... of these three significant beliefs?

Look at each one of them independently.

How would you come up with the significant beliefs?

I want you to do that in relation to the world and I want you to do it in relation to yourself; one is looking out and one is looking in. Let's talk about both of them. Let me use myself as an example.

I want you to try and look at over-arching beliefs; I want you to look at beliefs that really ... I don't want you to talk about the fact that, I believe that my car is a good car because it's economical on fuel, and it's not a hijacking target, something like that. I want you to talk about a belief that really conditions your world view. I might say in my case that I believe ... I believe – what do I believe? I would say in my case that I believe that truth is a relative term; I'm a relativist when it comes to truth; I believe that truth is a function of a particular set of propositions, and it doesn't exist objectively out there. I'm a complete relativist, so – I don't have any belief in an objective truth; I believe that truth is always relative. And because of that, it conditions the way I encounter systems of thought; if I encounter a system of thought, I don't ask the question, "Is this true?" I say to myself, "Is this useful?", "Can I use this?", "Does this help me to understand the world better?"

But it's limiting as well because I ... because what if there *is* an objective truth? Do what I mean? What if I've got it wrong? What if truth does exist as an objective property of the universe, and I'm just using a completely pragmatic lens, I use what suits me rather than what is true. It's quite a pervasive belief and it affects the way I interact with content that I'm coming across. In other words, I want you to really look at something that has quite a big effect on the

way you engage with the world, and the way you relate to the world. Does that make sense? Does it?

... to the world

To the world. Three significant beliefs that you have, about the world, or towards the world, or in relation to the world.

... and then three towards yourself

And then three towards yourself. I might say that I believe I am very clever, and that is a hell of a belief to have because it comes with a lot of ... it comes with a lot of stuff; it comes with a lot of assumptions; it comes with a lot of expectations; it comes ... it affects the way I do things; it affects the way I live my life; it affects opinions that I hold about myself and others. Where did that come from? Am I clever? Did somebody tell me I was clever? How do I know I'm clever? By what test ... how did I ... what is it – was it an IQ test? What is the justification for that? Is it true?

Your mum told you.

My mom told me. In my case she didn't actually, it's even more bizarre; I think my dad told me. Is it true and what does it mean? What does it mean to be clever? What does it mean to say, "I think I'm very clever"? One can look at the belief and just try to really get a handle on it. Are you happy with that? Are there any more questions on that because I want to show you one more application?

I don't think it's always easy to separate between, beliefs that are related to yourself and to the world. I mean ...

Yes, so can you give us an example?

I don't know; things like, maybe, causing no harm.

How would that be related to yourself?

Well, if I include myself in that ...

I see what you're saying. What I mean is this: causing no harm is a nice example actually. Let's assume your belief is, causing no harm; that one shouldn't cause harm, so that's the basic belief, isn't it? I would say that is a belief that conditions your relationship to the world. "I believe that one – and particularly myself because I've taken the belief on – should not cause harm." It is the way that you choose to interact with the world, or your interaction with the world is governed by that belief. But it's a belief that has a kind of an extraverted, external value; it's me in relation to the world. Whereas, maybe you believe ... maybe you believe about yourself ... well I don't want to give you a belief. Please give us one – something that you believe about yourself.

... Wait, I'm very slow in doing things.

That's a nice one. That's right, so you've got that specific belief about yourself; it's directed towards you rather ... it's not the belief that one shouldn't be slow, or the world is slow, or it's about yourself; I mean it is - that particular case, it is in relation to the world because obviously what you're saying is that, "The

world is faster than me.” (*Something relative*), there’s a relativity to it but nevertheless it’s about you. I think that would be a nice distinction, so the one ... the belief that, “I’m slow in the way I do things”, is a belief that I’ve come to hold about myself; and it’s a significant belief about myself, whereas the “harm” seems to be in relation to the way one should interact with the world. Because you’re not saying, for example, that I believe that slowness is a good thing, or it’s a bad thing; it’s just something that you believe about yourself. Probably, the truth is *you* think it’s a bad thing, but nevertheless, it’s directed at you, what I mean?

Is everyone ... is everyone happy with that? Does everyone get that?

I don’t know what you do with the three beliefs. That, I still don’t get.

What I want you to look at is where does the belief come from? How did you form the belief? It’s aetiology, to give it a technical term, how did you come to hold the belief? Then I want you to step outside of yourself and say, “Is this belief true? Is this objectively true? I’ve come to believe that I shouldn’t ... that doing harm in the world is wrong; it’s not something that one should do. Why do I believe that?” You kind of step outside of yourself, “Where does this come from? I mean, is this justified? Is this valid? Do other people believe it? If some people don’t, then why don’t they believe it? Why do I believe it? What is the ... what is my basis, of justifying that belief?” And then, “What impact does this belief have on my life? What is the effect of believing this? How does it affect the way I live my life? How does it affect me? How does it affect others? What is the effect – the impact – of the belief?”

It reminds me of the Byron Katie questions.

Really?

“Is it true? How does it affect you?”

, sure, she came and she cribbed my notes.

Those are the three. Those are the three questions.

Now don't get a fright when I turn over; we're going on to anima; that was animus. I'll put this all on Facebook or I'll e-mail it to you, but these are the anima questions that I want you to consider. The word that's missing at the end of each of these sentences is “most”. I want you to answer these questions: What do you love the most; hate the most; care about the most? And ideally, I'd like you to pick out a single thing in each case.

What do you love, not who?

But you can encompass the “who” in the “what” there.

I'm not very sure how you make the difference between love and care.

I care a great deal about my comfort; I like to be comfortable; I like to wear nice clothes; I like to drive a nice car; I like to live in a nice house; I like to eat well; I like to be warm; I sleep in a comfortable bed; I ... these things matter to me; I care about them. I wouldn't say I love them, that's ... love - love for me, is a stronger thing; it's like I would say I love my children. That's an emotion I have in a relationship in which I really love them. I care about them, but even the care that I feel is different from the care I feel about my comfort. I mean,

you can interpret it, as you want but I think that love is a feeling, in a way; it's more of a feeling, whereas the caring is a ... in some degree it's a commitment, maybe; it's something to do with, "I care about ..." it's almost as if I made a choice to care about something.

Well, you can care about people that are suffering.

You cannot love something if you don't care about it, that I know.

Yes, I agree.

If you love somebody it has to be coupled with caring, but you can care about someone without necessarily loving them.

Yes, that's right. I think ... I think that's probably true. You could say that love seems to include care – or most types of love; maybe there's some love that doesn't; I mean, maybe when one talks about really passionate love, it can border on ... it's not even about caring anymore; it's about something else, but I think love generally includes care – but care includes love in a different sense, it's like ...

It isn't necessarily included, I mean, you can ... you could care about the bees are all getting killed, but you're not necessarily saying you love bees; but you can care about them.

And the moment you care, you love!

That's love in a very broad sense. I can't say that I love bees, but I care about the fact that they're part of our environment.

I mean, this love-hate duality, I mean, that we often can experience in relation to someone where I both love and hate them simultaneously

Can you hate people you love?

(Really?) Exactly. That can also be another... *(They make you happy and sad?*

(All of this is like one person!) One person. There you've got it all! All integrated hey!

So what makes you happy? What makes you sad? What makes your life meaningful?

Applications:

General

1. What is your dominant function: thinking (rational) or feeling (irrational)?
2. Who is your ideal 1) thinking type and 2) feeling type? I.e. select a public personality that you feel is your ideal thinking type and one for feeling.

Animus (rational mind)

How do you arrive at views generally- about the world around you?

- Do you consider your opinions well informed?
- What holds the greater value for you subjective or objective truths?
- Are your opinions plastic, i.e. do they have a dynamic nature, are they pliable, or do they tend to be static?

Identify 3 significant beliefs you hold to be true about the world (directed outward towards the world); and 3 significant beliefs about yourself (inwardly directed). The more definitive these beliefs are about your world view and sense of identity the more valuable the application will be.

Once you have identified these answer the following questions:

1. Where did the belief come from, i.e. where did it originate, how did you come to believe this?
2. Is the belief objectively true, i.e. does this belief seem to be held by the majority of your community and/or is there some strong evidential justification for this belief?
3. What is the impact of this belief in your life and the lives of those around you?

Anima (irrational soul)

Answer the following questions as honestly as you possibly can:

1. What thing do you love most in the world?
2. What do you hate most?
3. What do you most care about?
4. What makes you most happy?
5. What makes you most sad?
6. What more than anything else makes this life worth living for you?
7. Do you nurture yourself?
 - a. Love yourself?
 - b. Care about yourself?

8. Consider where in your life you encounter the divine, the magical, the enchanted:
 - a. When, where, how?
 - b. How does this make you feel?
 - c. How do you act?

9. Where did you previously encounter the numinous (an awe-filled or divine experience) and how did you lose it? How has this affected you?