[12] This theme echoes Jung's comment in *The Red Book,* "I know, I have stridden across the depths. Through guilt I have become a newborn." (Jung, 2009, p.242)

CHAPTER 6

From Wotan to Christiana Morgan and Back Again: The Limits of the Archetypal/Personal Split

> The serious problems in life… are never fully solved. If ever they should appear to be so it is a sure sign that something has been lost. The meaning and purpose of a problem seem to lie not in its solution but in our working at it incessantly. This alone preserves us from stultification and petrifaction. (Jung, 1931b, para. 771)

I have suggested that during the period in which Jung began to formulate the concepts that would structure his mature psychology, his psychological writings were haunted by an unacknowledged one-sidedness, especially when it comes to the question of the relationship between the inner world and the outer world. This one-sidedness is carried through into the mature psychology in ways that distort its capacity to engage meaningfully with the outer dimension, whether collective, (i.e., the dimensions of the social and the political) or individual (the other person).

I ended the last chapter with a passage from *MDR* in which Jung suggested that at the time of writing *The Red Book,* he could see only "an irreconcilable contradiction between 'inner' and 'outer.'" And yet, Jung added, "I could not yet see that interaction of both worlds which I now understand." It is not immediately apparent from the context what Jung means by this last sentence, although he is clearly implying that in his later psychology, the inner dimension and the outer dimension no longer occupy the radically separate compartments we have noted in Jung's writings at the time of the confrontation with the unconscious. Now, (at

the time of writing *MDR*) Jung understands these dimensions to be engaged in a relationship that is far more interactional than he previously thought possible. In this chapter, I want to begin by focusing on two arenas of his mature psychology in which this interactional connection can be identified. The first is that of psychotherapy itself.

Jung's Two Models of Psychotherapy

When it comes to Jung's approach to the dynamics of psychotherapy, it is possible to identify two quite different analytic models embedded in Jung's writings—a one-person model and a two-person model (Giannoni, 2003). According to the first model, the process of individuation is primarily intrapsychic and moreover requires no intervention from outer influences. It follows that the role of the therapist is to act as a kind of companion and mentor facilitating the analysand's inner journey, which will take place (as in Jung's case during his confrontation with the unconscious) through intrapsychic encounters with *inner* others. We can see an excellent example of this approach in Jung's therapeutic relationship with Peter (Godwin) Baynes (1882-1943), Jung's translator and friend, who was to become Jung's assistant on his journey to Africa in 1925-26 (Burleson, 2005). During his first analysis with Jung, in Zurich in 1921, Baynes was encouraged by Jung to follow his own example—conducting active imaginations and engaging with the figures he encountered. In a contemporary notebook, Baynes described the relationship with Jung in this way:

> He is always in the background, felt rather than seen. He … seems to be hardly concerned with the actual nexus and incident of one's life. He is essentially a guide. He shows one the way but the actual business of analysis and self-evaluation he has left almost entirely to my own efforts. Actually, he knows very little about me and seems to care very little … yet I am as deeply under his directing influence as ever. (Jansen, 2003, p.129)

When Jung left Zurich on vacation, Baynes remarked, "My analysis has certainly improved while he has been gone and it is done as it were under Jung's eye." (Jansen, 2003, p.129) Clearly, such a style of analysis neither develops within nor depends upon a close relational connection between analyst and analysand.

Within this model of analysis, Jung by no means excludes the possibility that transference will occur during therapy, but he suggests that if it does so, it will take the form of the analysand projecting inner figures onto the analyst. These figures may be parental—derived from the patient's personal history—or, under some circumstances, archetypal (e.g., anima, animus, wise old man, etc.). These projections will, at a later stage, need to be withdrawn as the individuant becomes better acquainted with his or her cast of inner figures. As an example of an archetypal transference (and echoing Baynes' own idealising projection onto Jung), Jung mentions a patient who dreamed of Jung as a Godlike father figure. He interprets the dream as "the unconscious … trying to create a god out of the person of the doctor, as it were to free a vision of God from the veils of the personal." (Jung, 1928b, para 214)

The patient's (pseudo-)encounter with the analyst resembles then Jung's encounter with those women who carried Jung's anima projections. In both cases, an outer person acts as a kind of stand-in, required to carry the projection until such time as the individuant can take it back. At that point, individuation can resume its proper *intrapsychic* form. The point is that even when it *seems* to be occurring in or through an *outer* dimension, the transformational process is in fact taking place on the *inner* level. It is this model of analysis that Jung has in mind when, as we have seen, he characterises the individuation process as essentially a solitary exercise. According to this model, it is only when the process is completed and the newly individuated person is ready to finally return to the outer world that a more relational approach can be taken up toward the outer world and wider society.

However, in those of Jung's writings that directly address questions of practical psychotherapy, it is possible to discern a very different model of analysis. In contrast with the one-person model's emphasis upon

intrapsychic development, this model highlights those dimensions of psychotherapy that, because they are relational, mutual, and intersubjective, require a genuine meeting between two persons. For example, in 1929's "Problems of Modern Psychotherapy," Jung tells us:

> For two personalities to meet is like mixing two different chemical substances: if there is any combination at all, both are transformed. In any effective psychological treatment the doctor is bound to influence the patient; but this influence can only take place if the patient has a reciprocal influence on the doctor. You can exert no influence if you are not susceptible to influence. (Jung, 1929, para.163)

Such comments are difficult to reconcile with, for example, Baynes's description of his analysis with Jung. Here, Jung takes us far beyond the one-person model whereby the individuant utilises the analyst as a relatively neutral figure, a target for projections that are later to be taken back. According to the two-person model, the psychotherapeutic event is a genuine meeting—both reciprocal and mutual—and therefore an authentically relational encounter. Such a notion is founded upon Jung's stated assumption that "We cannot fully understand the psychology of the child or that of the adult if we regard it as the subjective concern of the individual alone, for almost more important than this is his relation to others." (Jung, 1931a, para. 80)

From this perspective, the transformational aspect of the individuation process is closely entwined with—if not identical to—actual engagement with another person: "No longer is [the analyst] the superior wise man, judge, and counselor; he is a fellow participant who finds himself involved in the dialectical process just as deeply as the so-called patient." (Jung, 1935b, para. 8)

Jung's ideas on the theory and practice of psychotherapy are articulated in their most complete form in his *Psychology of the Transference* (Jung, 1946). Here, Jung conveys a strong conviction that the individuation process, as pursued within analysis, is intrinsically relational: "The unrelated

human being lacks wholeness, for he can achieve wholeness only through the soul, and the soul cannot exist without its other side, which is always found in a 'You.'" (Jung, 1946, para. 454) This is a process that necessarily entails not only the patient's total involvement but also a mutual and reciprocal counterinvolvement by the therapist as what Jung describes as the "whole man" (Jung, 1946, para. 367): "The doctor is inclined to demand … total effort from his patient, yet he must realize that this same demand only works if he is aware that it applies also to himself." (Jung, 1946, para. 367) In *MDR*, Jung clearly states that in psychotherapy, transformation requires a two-person encounter:

> For psychotherapy to be effective, a close rapport is needed. … The rapport consists … in the dialectical confrontation of two opposing psychic realities. If for some reason these mutual impressions do not impinge on each other, the psychotherapeutic process remains ineffective, and no change is produced. Unless both doctor and patient become a problem to each other, no solution is found. (Jung, 1989, p.143)

Though he rarely uses the term *countertransference*, Jung's persistent stress upon the importance of mutuality within therapy, and its value for therapeutic understanding, ensures his position as a pioneer in the field. Indeed, in his *History of Countertransference*, psychoanalyst Alberto Stefana acknowledges Jung's role as "the person who probably preceded everyone on the issue of countertransference." (Stefana, 2017, p.35)[1]

Jung's writings on psychotherapy indicate that awareness and analysis of the countertransference offer the analyst insights that he/she might otherwise miss. As he puts it, "It is futile for the doctor to shield himself from the influence of the patient and to surround himself with a smoke-screen of fatherly and professional authority. By so doing he only deprives himself of a highly important organ of information." (Jung, 1929, para.163)

The issue of countertransference is important to the argument of this book because it points to the fact that the psychological transformation emerges not solely from the inner work of the patient, important though

that is, or solely from the mentoring, suggestions, or interpretations of the therapist, but rather from the relationship dynamics that develop *between* the analyst and analysand. Jung's *Psychology of the Transference* uses alchemical imagery to depict the complexity of conscious and unconscious relations between the analytic partners. Jung illustrates this dynamic with a useful diagram.



Figure 4. Jung's Transference/Countertransference diagram from *Psychology of the Transference*

The arrows in the diagram help us differentiate various relational connections. These include the ordinary ego-to-ego conscious connection (a), and the projective connections we have encountered in the one-person model (e and f). However, the level of relational connection that Jung is referring to when he characterises the therapeutic encounter as a mutually transformative chemical combination also involves the relation depicted by arrow (b). This is the connection he refers to when he suggests, "Even the most experienced psychotherapist will discover again and again that he is caught up in a bond, a combination resting on mutual unconsciousness." (Jung, 1946, para.367) Elsewhere he takes this idea further: "The patient, by bringing an activated unconscious content to bear upon the doctor, constellates the corresponding unconscious material in him." (Jung, 1946, para.364)

Jung uses the term "the third" to articulate that dimension of the therapeutic event (and the vessel that contains it) which reveals itself in the form of the dynamic field within which the analytic relationship itself operates: "Psychological induction inevitably causes the two parties to get involved in the transformation *of the third* and to be themselves transformed in the process." (Jung, 1946, para.399) Joe Cambray suggests that, in terms of Jung's diagram, "[t]he "third" could be understood as emerging from [its] combined pathways … especially those in the central region (paths a, b, e, and f)." This relational process therefore offers analyst and analysand the chance to coconstruct transformative meaning "from our mutual experiences, conscious and unconscious, atop an archetypal base." (Cambray, 2012, p.85)

Therapy and Synchronicity

It is significant that Cambray's useful comment, which highlights the interaction of both personal *and* archetypal aspects within the analytic encounter, is to be found in a book on the subject of synchronicity, a topic that took a great deal of Jung's attention and time in his later years. Synchronicity, like the transference, arguably exemplifies the interaction of both inner and outer dimensions. On occasion, Jung himself linked the two topics: "The relationship between doctor and patient … especially when a transference on the part of the patient occurs, or a more or less unconscious identification of doctor and patient, can lead to parapsychological [i.e. synchronistic] phenomena." (Jung, 1989, p.159)

Nonetheless, on the whole, Jung's writings on synchronicity focus more upon the wider theoretical implications of his idea rather than the emergence of synchronicities within clinical settings and their meanings within that interactional context. This has not prevented several of his followers from expanding upon parallels between the clinical and the synchronistic, and especially Jung's suggestion that analysis occurs in a "third" field, which operates outside (on top of, or beneath) those intrapsychic processes that occur *within* the analytic partners *as individuals* (Main, 2007). For example, Hans Dieckmann reported that a research project investigating the unconscious interaction between analyst and

patient showed "an astonishing increase in the phenomena of synchronicity" when the researchers "started to keep more accurate records of the subliminal perceptions of the analyst." (Dieckmann, 1976, p.27)

This link between the clinical and the synchronistic is of interest to this inquiry because it throws light upon the problem of the relation of inner to outer. Jung's ideas on transference/countertransference do so by drawing attention to the relation between the inner world of the individuant and the outer encounter with the analyst (via "the third"). Jung's ideas on synchronicity come at the same problem but from a different perspective. Jung defines synchronicity as "the simultaneous occurrence of a certain psychic state [inner] with one or more external events [outer] which appear as meaningful parallels to the momentary subjective state." (Jung, 1952, para.850) Although this definition mentions merely "parallels" between outer and inner, what drew Jung's attention to what he emphatically described as a *connecting* principle was the potential of synchronistic events to bring about psychological transformation.

Let us take a closer look at the ur-example of synchronicity, the episode that Jung most often refers to when explaining the idea. It occurred during the analysis of a young woman patient Jung describes as "psychologically inaccessible." He tells us that he was unable to make headway in analysing her and therefore confined himself to "the hope that something unexpected would turn up, something that would burst the intellectual retort into which she had sealed herself." (Jung, 1952, para. 982) Jung describes what happened next:

> Well, I was sitting opposite her one day, with my back to the window, listening to her flow of rhetoric. She had had an impressive dream the night before, in which someone had given her a golden scarab—a costly piece of jewellery. While she was still telling me this dream, I heard something behind me gently tapping on the window. I turned round and saw that it was a fairly large flying insect that was knocking against the window-pane in the obvious effort to get into the dark room. This seemed to me very strange. I opened the window immediately and caught the insect in the air as it flew in. It was a scarabaeid beetle, or common rose-chafer (Cetonia aurata), whose gold-green colour most nearly resembles that of a golden scarab. I handed the beetle to my patient with the words, 'Here is your scarab'. This experience punctured the desired hole in her rationalism and broke the ice of her intellectual resistance. The treatment could now be continued with satisfactory results. (Jung, 1952, para. 982)

Jung's narration of this synchronistic event focuses on the meaningful connection between inner (patient's dream) and outer (scarab beetle). However, the *context* of this connection was that of a specific event of transference/countertransference. This showed up as a sense of stuckness manifesting in the field between patient and doctor; the patient certainly feels stuck, but in terms of the analysis, so does Jung. In his account, Jung chooses to emphasise the subjectively experienced intrapsychic aspect of the patient's psychological breakthrough. He pays less attention to the simultaneous breakthrough that occurred in the *analytic process as a whole*. Yet, the latter breakthrough is arguably the important one, since, as we have seen, the stuckness was experienced not so much in either partner—Jung or the patient—as in the *field* connecting and containing the two of them. One is reminded of Jung's comment in *MDR*: "Unless both doctor and patient become a problem to each other, no solution is found." (Jung, 1989, p.143)

Evidently, in both the clinical arena and the synchronistic arena, and especially in the areas we have identified in which the two overlap, Jung is developing psychological ideas that move beyond the approach that we identified in the *Red Book* period, whereby inner was strictly segregated from outer.

If we now apply the dual lens perspective of the two personalities to these questions, we can see that Jung is bringing inner (personality No. 2) into relation to outer (personality No. 1), and thereby applying a binocular

perspective to the issues, and it is this approach that constellates the transformative dimension of the process.

In the clinical encounter, as Jung's diagram makes clear, the analysand's personality No. 1 is in relation with the analyst's personality No. 1 (line a), the analyst's personality No. 1 is in relation with his/her own personality No. 2 (line c), and with the analysand's personality No. 2 (line e), and the analysand's personality No. 1 is in relation with his own No. 2 (line d) and with the analyst's No. 2 (line f). Finally, the personality No. 2 of both partners is in mutual relation (b). As Cambray pointed out, it is the relational field containing *all* of these connections that constitutes the transformative combination Jung describes as "the third": the arena in which both an inner (No. 2) process and an outer (No. 1) process come together.

In the classic synchronistic case of the scarab beetle, one way to understand the presenting problem of the client is that of a failure of connection between personality No. 1 and personality No. 2. Jung describes the client as "psychologically inaccessible." Her one-sidedness indicates that her personality No. 1 is out of touch with her No. 2. In the analytic context, this also means that there is some kind of blockage in the relationship between her No. 1 and Jung, who is acting as No. 2-by-proxy (via the transference). Although she (No. 1) is perfectly capable of communicating about the nature of her problem with Jung (No. 1), on a common-sense rational level (line a), that knowledge is not transformative because there is no active line of communication between her No. 1 and either her own No. 2 or Jung's No. 2. This means she has no access to the kind of intuitive insights that might enable her to break the psychological impasse that confronts her (and Jung). This also means that the field of "the third" (within which No. 1 and No. 2 would be able to communicate) remains unavailable, not only to her, but also to Jung. This is why the synchronistic event of the arrival of the scarab not only, as Jung puts it, "punctured the desired hole in her rationalism and broke the ice of her intellectual resistance" but simultaneously broke through whatever had simultaneously impeded the client's access to Jung's No. 2 and to her own No. 2, thus enabling access to "the third."

There remains another dimension of this synchronicity that we have yet to mention. As Roderick Main has pointed out, the image of the scarab had been particularly numinous for Jung long before this particular scarab flew into the consulting room. A scarab features in the vision that began Jung's 1913 confrontation with the unconscious (Jung, 1989, p.179), and its mythic/symbolic significance is explored in *The Red Book* (Jung, 2009, p.271). As Main has carefully traced, Jung was also well acquainted with the scarab's alchemical significance (Main, 2013, pp. 140ff.). In brief, the scarab powerfully evoked for Jung the personality No. 2 motifs of death and rebirth—because it had historically come to him at times of sterility. As Main puts it, this implies that the "incident involving the scarab beetle was a synchronicity not only for the patient but also for Jung." (Main, 2013, p.137) The rebirth constellated by the scarab that came to the window was not only relevant to the psyche of a one-sided patient, it was also significant for Jung. The subsequent psychic rebirth involved not only the patient's potential for wholeness, but Jung's own revivified link with his own unconscious. But the crucial point I want to make here is that it was an event of living relation between these two dimensions. In the overall context of the analysis, the breakthrough that enabled the treatment to "be continued with satisfactory results" therefore involved the simultaneous interaction of all of these multifaceted dimensions.

However, although these different aspects of the scarab synchronicity offer us a certain understanding of the nature of the problem and its solution, there remains a question as to why this problem occurred in this way within this particular therapy.

Jung's Countertransferences

As it happens, Jung's account of the case contains a significant distortion. As we have already noted, when Jung recounted the scarab case, he directed the reader's attention toward the patient and her state of psychological stuckness. This focus has the effect of distracting the reader from the nature of Jung's involvement in that stuckness and how it might have contributed to the situation. We can gain a better

understanding of the full context of this case if we look more closely into its biographical details.

Recent research by Vicente de Moura has revealed the identity of this particular client. According to de Moura, Madeleine Reichstein Quarles van Ufford (1894-1975) was not only the patient in the original case of synchronicity, but she also constellated a well-known dream of Jung's, which he recounts in *MDR* as an example of psychic compensation (Moura, 2014). In the dream, Jung craned his neck in order to see his patient far above him. Jung concluded that the dream image was compensating his own tendency to look down upon this particular patient. In *MDR*, Jung offered some personal background to the dream: "At first the analysis went very well, but after a while I began to feel that I was no longer getting at the correct interpretation of her dreams, and I thought I also noticed an increasing shallowness in our dialogue." (Jung, 1989, p.133) After the dream, Jung decided to inform his client of both dream and interpretation, and he tells us (in words that cannot help but remind us of those that concluded his account of the scarab synchronicity) that "[t]his produced an immediate change in the situation, and the treatment once more began to move forward." (Jung, 1989, p.133)

It would seem that this was a case that required, on at least two occasions, an unusually powerful intervention from the unconscious. We do not know which occurred first—dream or synchronicity—but what we can identify is a pattern whereby the analytic relationship between Jung and Reichstein became repeatedly stuck, and, with regard to the dream at least, the problem seems to have been related to Jung's attitude toward the client. This opens up the possibility that it was this same problem that lay behind the synchronistic event. What we do know is that more was going on in this case than Jung was acknowledging in his own published accounts. Peter Baynes records a conversation with Jung in about 1930 on the topic of the kinds of anima difficulties that can cause problems in analysis. Jung explained to Baynes:

> [H]ow he had himself been caught by a counter-transference to a beautiful aristocratic girl [Reichstein] and how he had a dream in which she was enthroned very high on an Eastern temple, high above him. And this explained how all his knowledge and interest in Oriental ideas and feelings had developed out of his transference to the girl. He had, as he said, to cut off his head and learn to submit his ignorance to his patient. (Jansen, 2003, pp.244–45)

If Jung was indeed "caught by a counter-transference" to this particular patient (and as we know, it wouldn't have been the first or last time that such a thing occurred), then we can perhaps begin to understand the repeated impasses and subsequent unconscious interventions that seem to have characterised the case. By investigating these dynamics, we are neither resorting to gossip nor reducing the matter to a merely personal affair, but casting light upon the complicated interrelationships between the personal and the archetypal, and thereby achieving a better theoretical grasp of the role of synchronicities and compensatory dreams within analysis as a whole.

It would seem that in this case there was only one remaining psychological avenue through which transformation of both partners could occur, and that meant Jung needing to "cut off his head and learn to submit his ignorance to his patient," thus activating that field that Jung calls "the third." In *Psychology of the Transference,* Jung eloquently describes a situation of this kind: "The elusive, deceptive, ever-changing content that possesses the patient like a demon now flits about from patient to doctor and, as the third party in the alliance, continues its game, sometimes impish and teasing, sometimes really diabolical." (Jung, 1946, para. 384) In the Reichstein case, it was the scarab beetle that flitted about "from patient to doctor" (flitting also between literal and metaphorical!). The relational deadlock between the two partners thus became the very *prima materia* out of which insight could begin to emerge for both analyst and analysand.

However, this realisation brings with it a problem. It needs to be acknowledged that it has taken 90 years for us to get a glimpse of precisely how these insights came about, and we have achieved it *despite* Jung's attempts to disguise the truth of the matter. This situation is not unique,

and it has had consequences for Jungian psychology. Jung's reluctance to acknowledge the role of countertransference problems in any of his accounts of the scarab beetle synchronicity has had the effect of significantly skewing the theoretical focus away from that of the therapeutic relationship between analyst and analysand and toward that of an intrapsychic difficulty *located within the patient alone*. In this case, we have been led to believe that it was *Reichstein's* problem alone and not a two-person problem within the therapy. Jung seeks to focus our attention on the stuckness of the client, thus distracting us from the transference/countertransference difficulties that evidently characterised the case as a whole. The relational dimension of the problem has thereby become occluded. What is lost is the crucial information that, when it comes to clinical work, a synchronicity is an expression, as it were, of "the third"—which is why the synchronistic event occurs *outside* of either client or analyst, though *inside* the relationship between them.

When we looked at the relational complexities of the events described in Jung's doctoral dissertation and in his account of the birth of the anima, we noted a persistent tendency to suppress highly relevant details of the actual clinical settings out of which Jung's insights were constellated and that this tendency was intensified when those settings involved his own countertransference tangles. On the basis of the case we have been looking at here, it would seem that this pattern continued well into the period of Jung's mature psychology. As we will see later in the chapter, it is also to be found in one of Jung's most famous cases—that of Christiana Morgan.

Universal and Particular

As Roderick Main has observed, Jung "only rarely—and never in detail—discussed the clinical dimension of synchronicities. The bulk of his writing on the topic is concerned with theoretical issues." (Main, 2007, pp.368–69) We have noted Jung's reluctance to divulge his own countertransferences, but the higher-order issue of which this is merely a particular instance is Jung's general tendency to maintain a segregation between that dimension of psychology that he categorises as archetypal

from that described as personal. One way in which this shows up is as a preference, when it comes to discussing psychological theory, to approach it on the universal level, and to avoid specific clinical accounts—except when he judges that a clinical vignette can illustrate the general theoretical point. This emphasis upon the broadly archetypal dimension of his psychology has the inevitable effect of obscuring or even erasing the complexity and density of the relational dimension.

I would like now to focus on what occurred in Jung's therapeutic work with his patients. The possibilities for research on this topic are constricted by the fact that, as Sedgwick points out,

> Jung's opus is virtually devoid of clinical examples. It begs for the grounding in therapeutic reality that a practical example would give. The unconscious material in impersonal form … is given prominence over the "personal," just as it is in Jung's extended case studies." (Sedgwick, 1994, p.5)

James Hillman has also highlighted Jung's tendency, in those of his texts that deal extensively with a single case (series of visions or dreams), to choose patients who were not his own (Hillman, 2012, pp.31-32).[2] However, as we shall see, even the cases where Jung delivers a kind of proxy-analysis can tell us a great deal about Jung's approach to clinical work.

Pauli

Let us take as our first example that of Wolfgang Pauli, the great physicist who provided the dreams that Jung analyses in his *Psychology and Alchemy* (Jung, 1966), and with whom Jung later actively collaborated while developing his work on synchronicity (Gieser, 2005). When Pauli, a prolific dreamer, first approached Jung for treatment in 1932, Jung took deliberate steps to avoid exerting any "influence" upon what he regarded as Pauli's unadulterated archetypal material. In the Tavistock Lectures, Jung describes the situation thus: "I saw he [Pauli] was chock-full of archaic material, and I said to myself: 'Now I am going to make an interesting

experiment, to get that material absolutely pure, without any influence myself, I won't touch it.'" (Jung, 1935c, para. 402)

Jung therefore made the decision to entrust the case to Dr. Erna Rosenbaum, "a beginner … who did not know much about archetypal material." (Jung, 1935c, para. 402) Jung's implication here is that his own understanding of archetypal symbolism—even when unarticulated - could be enough to risk influencing Pauli in ways that might taint the purity of his "archaic material." Jung appears to allude to this situation in a 1952 interview: "For fifteen years I studied alchemy, but I never spoke to anyone about it; I did not wish to influence my patients or my fellow workers by suggestion." (Jung, 1987, pp.227–28)

Jung tells us that for Dr. Rosenbaum this problem didn't occur on either conscious or unconscious levels since she offered no "interpretations worth mentioning … because the dreamer, owing to his excellent scientific training and ability, did not require any assistance. Hence conditions were really ideal for unprejudiced observation and recording." (Jung, 1944, para. 45) One wonders exactly what kind of therapy Rosenbaum was able to supply, given that she had been assigned the status of a glorified laboratory assistant. Jung seems to have made the blithe assumption that during the period of Pauli's analysis with Rosenbaum, Pauli would continue to produce dreams that were "chock-full of archaic material" and (therefore?) empty of, for example, transferential material. This seems a particularly strange assumption given that Jung had specifically chosen a woman analyst for Pauli because of the physicist's anima problems. It would seem that the factor overriding all others here was Jung's need to gain proof of the archetypal nature of individuation. Interestingly, Jung seems to have assumed that Pauli's "natural process of individuation" would remain unaffected by the therapeutic relationship with Rosenbaum, since she "did not know much about archetypal material."

Although the analysis with Rosenbaum lasted only five months, it has been claimed that Paul did nonetheless develop "transferential feelings toward her." (Cohen, 2015, p.44) Certainly, when, years later, Pauli restarted analysis with Marie Louise von Franz, transference problems proliferated. Von Franz commented that Pauli "didn't submit to the transference" and

that this "made our work together very difficult from the start." (Franz, 1991, p.56) Others have claimed that the relationship with von Franz was characterised by a mutual transference (Gieser, 2005, p.148), a claim possibly supported by the fact that, after Pauli's death, his widow burned all von Franz's letters.

Whatever the nature of the transference, it is clear that some kind of transferential relationship existed between Pauli and his analysts, and it is also clear that, when approaching the dreams that Pauli produced during these years, Jung deliberately chose to ignore this personal dimension. He tells us that in the "abbreviated" versions of the dreams presented in *Psychology and Alchemy,* he has "removed personal allusions and complications, as was necessary for reasons of discretion." (Jung, 1944/52, para 47) This presumably means that the material we get to see has been pruned so as to highlight the solely archetypal aspects of the dreams. We have to assume that the original uncensored versions would have constituted a fabric in which archetypal motifs were interwoven with personal motifs.

Jung is well aware that he is thereby distorting the dreams, and he draws our attention to it when he makes a point of contrasting his usual method of approaching dreams with the method he utilises here. Under normal circumstances (i.e., clinically), he tells us, he would seek to approach dreams with no preconceptions, aiming to discover the unique (personal) context in response to which this particular dream has appeared. In this case, however, as he puts it, his method runs "directly counter to this basic principle of dream interpretation." Because Jung was not Pauli's analyst when the dreams were dreamed, he is not acquainted with the personal context. He therefore proceeds, he tells us, by treating the dreams not as individual examples (which he acknowledges would require interpretation according to the particular context), but as an entire series. This justifies Jung in discerning their meaning within the series taken as a whole, which he performs by concentrating upon the resonances between images from different dreams, "throwing light from all sides on the unknown terms, so that a reading of all the texts is sufficient to elucidate the difficult passages in each individual one." (Jung, 1944/52, para. 50) This process, which as he

himself acknowledges is "largely conjecture," is nonetheless aided (in a strikingly circular way) by Jung's amplificatory approach. For example, "in the third chapter we are concerned with a definite archetype—the mandala—that has long been known to us from other sources, and this considerably facilitates the interpretation." (Jung, 1944/52, para. 50) Jung reassures us as to the reliability of such an approach by telling us that "the series as a whole gives us all the clues we need to correct any possible errors in the preceding passages."

What Jung doesn't seem to be aware of is the strong possibility that such a hermeneutic will be extremely vulnerable to a viciously circular logic. The dreams and their interpretations by Jung are ungrounded in two related ways. First, outside their personal context, they can no longer be interpreted as compensatory to the conscious life of the dreamer. Second, because dreams are inevitably born out of and express something of the analytic relationship itself, their interpretation needs to take that relationship into account. Jung was well aware of this. In 1934, he wrote to James Kirsch, "With regard to your patient, it is quite correct that her dreams are occasioned by you. ... As soon as certain patients come to me for treatment, the type of dream changes. In the deepest sense, we all dream not out of ourselves but out of what lies between us and the other." (Jung, 1973b, p.172) Despite this important insight, Jung's primary intention here seems to be to give himself an entirely free hand to amplify the images as it pleased him, or as he described it, "as if I had had the dreams myself and were therefore in a position to supply the context," (Jung, 1944/52, para. 49) but he can achieve this only by keeping himself deliberately ignorant of this relational dimension, thus occluding a significant resource of meaning.

For all the virtuosic interpretations Jung provides us with in *Psychology and Alchemy*, what we are being offered is yet another example of Jung's persistent desire to keep the inner (No. 2) realm of the high archetypal compartmentalised away from the outer (No. 1) realm of the low personal (transference/countertransference). The net result of this segregation is that any scientific conclusions that Jung might have drawn from the "experiment" in question are not only distorted but fatally undermined.[3]

Betsy Cohen may well be right when she suggests that "Jung wanted to prove that Pauli's archetypal dreams and drawings, part of the objective psyche ('collective unconscious'), illustrated the blueprint for the natural process of individuation; and therefore, [he examined] the progression of the dreams in as pure and impersonal a way as possible" (Cohen, 2015, p.43). Nonetheless, as we have seen, such an approach was ultimately counterproductive.

The Need to Compartmentalise

We have identified in Jung a consistent determination to keep the outer/personal/relational dimension separate from the inner/archetypal level: "It is therefore absolutely essential to make the sharpest possible demarcation between the personal and the impersonal attributes of psyche." (Jung, 1917b, para.150). By suppressing details about the counter-transferential involvement of the analyst in cases that he simultaneously held up as providing evidence of objective archetypal patterns, Jung's intention seems rather to distract his readers from the crucial connection between the personal and the collective unconscious.

As we have seen in those of Jung's texts that are devoted to the practice of psychotherapy, we find a contrasting emphasis upon the therapeutic necessity for the kind of complex, mutually transforming, encounter in which both archetypal and personal strands were inextricably intertwined (Jung, 1929, 1935b, 1946). However, of the 20 volumes of the *Collected Works*, there is only one volume devoted to psychotherapy as such; the remaining volumes focus upon theoretical matters and overwhelmingly upon symbolic and archetypal themes. These often occur in contexts which, on the face of it, have no obvious connection with practical psychology, such as Eastern religion, Gnosticism, flying saucers, parapsychology, Nietzsche's philosophy, astrology, mythology, anthropology, etc. To the bewilderment of many, the field that Jung most extensively worked, especially in his later works, was that of alchemy.

Alchemy, etc.

It would be quite wrong, however, to represent Jung's interest in these obscure or marginal topics as merely a retreat into esotericism for its own sake. The red thread that runs through all Jung's interests is what he calls "the problem of the opposites"—a problem that had originally arisen in the context of his experience of the two personalities. For example, Jung's enthusiasm for alchemy in the last period of his creative life was directly relevant to precisely the issue we have been addressing in this book, the relation of outer to inner. We have seen how the topics of both counter-transference and synchronicity share an acknowledgment that the psychological dimensions of both *outer* world and *inner* world are intimately interwoven. It is this relationship (correspondence) between the two realms that drew Jung to alchemy, in which he saw a vital connection between the two.[4]

However, Jung's approach to alchemy seems on the face of it to maintain the same strict inner/outer compartmentalisation that we have observed elsewhere in his psychology. Here, as elsewhere, Jung relies heavily upon the concept of projection to articulate the relation of inner to outer. For example, he describes the alchemists as simply projecting inner psychic phenomena onto the outer material events they witnessed in their retorts:

> The real nature of matter was unknown to the alchemist: he knew it only in hints. In seeking to explore it he projected the unconscious into the darkness of matter in order to illuminate it. In order to explain the mystery of matter he projected yet another mystery—his own psychic background—into what was to be explained: *Obscurum per obscurius, ignotum per ignotius!* This procedure was not, of course, intentional; it was an involuntary occurrence. (Jung, 1944, para.345)

Jung seems to imply that the complex imagery of alchemy represents nothing but an outward representation of inner psychological dramas that unfolded unconsciously within the minds of the alchemists. There is also an implication that we moderns have now solved the mysteries that

confused the alchemists—not only the psychological mysteries of individuation, but also the physical mysteries of matter. However, Jung's position is in fact not as reductive as this sounds; elsewhere, he implies that both modern physics and modern psychology (by which he means his own psychology) suffer from the limitations of a model that separates the inner world from the outer world. It is this realisation that lies behind Jung's project of reanimating the alchemical perspective, by giving it a new, psychological, form:

> [T]he moment when physics touches on the "untrodden, untreadable regions," and when psychology has at the same time to admit that there are other forms of psychic life besides the acquisitions of personal consciousness—in other words, when psychology too touches on an impenetrable darkness—then the intermediate realm of subtle bodies comes to life again, and the physical and the psychic are once more blended in an indissoluble unity. We have come very near to this turning-point today. (Jung, 1944, para. 394)

Here, just as in his contemporary writings on synchronicity, Jung seems to be keen to push psychology into a conceptual region within which the inner/outer division no longer holds. Von Franz describes such a perspective succinctly in an essay on the alchemical approach to the matter/psyche question:

> [I]t is to be suspected that our division into material versus mental, that which is observable from the outside versus that which is perceivable from the inside, is only a subjectively valid separation, only a limited polarization that our structure of consciousness imposes on us but that actually does not correspond to the wholeness of reality. In fact it is rather to be suspected that these two poles actually constitute a unitary reality. (von Franz, 1992, p.11)

It was in order to articulate this highly speculative holistic vision that Jung revived the concept of the *Unus Mundus* (Jung, 1955, paras. 659ff), first found in the alchemical writings of Gerhard Dorn (1530-84).

From this brief summary, it is possible to see that Jung, in his later psychology, made efforts to move beyond the limitations of a dichotomous perspective that insists upon imposing a categorical distinction between psyche and matter, or inside and outside. This was perhaps what Jung had in mind when he made his *MDR* comment that at the time of *The Red Book* he "could not yet see that interaction of both worlds which I now understand."

Unfortunately, it also brings us up against the fact that, for all Jung's attempts to twist free of such differentiations, he chooses to address these questions by utilising the kind of transcendental approach that is squarely aligned with his No. 2 personality. Such an approach necessarily excludes the personality No. 1 dimension.

For example, in his work on synchronicity, Jung attempts to transcend the opposition of matter vs. spirit by invoking the highly abstract principles of modern physics. As we have seen, he generally avoids making a direct connection between these speculations and clinical practice or even the psychological experience of the individual. Although Jung frequently claims that his aim is to avoid a reductive approach, his actual practice pulls him away from the relational and affective specificity of personal life—the dimension of existence in which the outer naturally dwells. References to the archetypal unity of spirit/matter have a nicely paradoxical sound, but to attain a truly binocular perspective, Jung would need to explore how and where the opposition is experienced in time by the concrete individual.[5] What this means is that Jung performs only half the psychological work. It is left to us, his readers, to take up the task of translating it back into the more grounded (No. 1) language of experience, thereby bringing the two personalities back into conversation.[6]

The Yellowing

We can see the limitations of a one-sided Jungian approach if we look at Jung's writings on a crucially important moment in the alchemical

process, the shift from the stage of albedo, or whitening, to the final stage of rubedo, or reddening.

Many alchemical texts describe three stages to the alchemical opus, first the nigredo, or blackening, second the albedo, or whitening, and third, the rubedo, or reddening. As we enter the albedo phase, Jung tells us, we emerge from the painful and dark stage of the nigredo. The albedo is the "first main goal of the process," a moment that is "highly prized by many alchemists as if it were the ultimate goal." (Jung, 1944, para. 334) However, it is in fact only the penultimate stage: "The albedo [whitening] is, so to speak, the daybreak, but not till the rubedo is it sunrise." (Jung, 1944, para. 334) In a 1952 interview conducted by Mircea Eliade, Jung explicates this in psychological terms:

> [In] this state of "whiteness" one does not live in the true sense of the word, it is a sort of abstract, ideal state. In order to make it come alive it must have "blood," it must have what the alchemists call the rubedo, the "redness" of life. Only the total experience of being can transform this ideal state of the albedo into a fully human mode of existence. (Jung, 1987, p.229)

For Jung, this transition represents the birth of a new personality through relationship with the self, an interior process that involves the bringing together of the opposites, and especially the opposites of conscious and unconscious. In the Eliade interview, Jung depicts the albedo/rubedo transition in quasi-theological terms as an intrapsychic shift whereby evil becomes fully integrated into consciousness so that "the devil no longer has an autonomous existence but rejoins the profound unity of the psyche." (Jung, 1987, p. 229) Jung may describe the rubedo as a "fully human mode of existence," but his emphasis is entirely on the achievement of wholeness on the *intrapsychic* level. For example, "inner conflict, … always the source of profound and dangerous psychological crises," (Jung, 1987, p. 230) may be transcended, Jung suggests, through an experience of God qua *coincidentia oppositorum*. Clearly, this is an approach that remains squarely within the inner dimension of personality No. 2.

We can detect a dissatisfaction with Jung's approach in James Hillman's post-Jungian treatment of the same topic (Hillman, 1991).[7] In his 1991 paper, *The Yellowing of the Work* Hillman noted that in early alchemy, the three stages—*nigredo*, *albedo* and *rubedo*—were sometimes augmented by a further transitional stage known as the yellowing (*citrinitas* or *xanthosis*). This stage denoted that moment in the process when the *albedo* (whereby "the anima or soul infuses the work with its whiteness" [Hillman, 1991, p.83]) lost its virginal purity and became yellow on its way toward the final reddening. In contrast with the abstract quality of Jung's approach, Hillman chooses to discuss the topic from a clinical perspective (thereby necessarily introducing a relational aspect to the discussion):

> In analysis, this whiteness refers to feelings of positive syntonic transference, of things going easily and smoothly, a gentle, sweet safety in the vessel, insights rising, synchronistic connections, resonances and echoes, the dead alive on the moon as ancestors who speak with internal voices of the activated imagination—all leading to the invulnerable conviction of the primacy of psychic reality as another world apart from this world, life lived in psychological faith. (Hillman, 1991, p.84)

It seems to me that with this depiction of the albedo-dimension Hillman is also describing the therapeutic setting under the enchanted sway of personality No. 2—when, that is, it is kept separate from personality No. 1. In alchemical terms, an albedo therapy of this sort, which Hillman depicts in its peculiarly Jungian form, is lacking something important; it awaits the final yellowing transition, which will move the therapy away from what Jungian analyst and writer Stanton Marlan describes as "the whiteness and abstractions of psychological insight," (Marlan, 2014, p.112) and into something more full-bloodedly worldly—something, we might suggest, that involves the personality No. 1 dimension of life.

This seems to be what Jason Butler is also pointing to when he suggests that "the yellowing of the work marks a needed shift from the

unio mentalis, the union of soul and spirit, toward a meeting of soul in body and world." (Butler, 2014, p.120) We should not, however, understand this shift solely in linear developmental terms. In a binocular approach, the *inner* "abstractions of psychological insight," which we have observed dominating Jung's psychological works (and, by most accounts, his therapeutic work), are not merely left behind or replaced by the more worldly and relational *outer* engagement, in a swing from one pole to the other. This alchemical transition entails the colouring (yellowing) of psychological life through the meeting of opposites. However, these are not the purely *inner* opposites implied in Jung's account, but the opposites of 1) inner-facing personality No. 2 insight, and 2) outer-facing personality No. 1 engagement.

If the albedo is an inner-facing process, the yellowing, as Hillman puts it, is to be found "outside: wherever interest is kindled, wherever the active attention (or what Freud named "object libido") turns away from itself to things, things lighting up to be consumed," (Hillman, 1991, p.83) It points outward toward "anywhere that the different appears, anything outside subjective reflection, any moment that intrudes upon white consciousness's love of its own lunar illumination, which is precisely where its blindness lies." (Hillman, 1991, p.84) However, it is important to remember that this dimension of outer engagement is held in tension with an inner reflective quality, such that in the process ("the third") both inner and outer are mutually transformed. This transformed state is what the alchemists imagine as the *rubedo*.

It is interesting to note that by introducing a clinical vignette into his paper, Hillman goes against his usual practice. Like Jung, Hillman generally prefers to avoid case histories (Hillman, 2012). Here, however, he clearly feels the topic needs the injection of a more relational dimension.

As we have seen, Hillman's description of the albedo phase of the therapy chimes with Jung's descriptions of the personality No. 2 realm:

> Hers had been a very white analysis: two or three times a week; many dreams each session which she worked on assiduously; hours of solitude; reading, reflection, reverie, imagination, memory, nature; few relationships; eating alone; isolation owing

> to language difficulties; feelings and fantasies focused on the analysis and on me, the analyst. (Hillman, 1991, p.89)

However, as the therapy enters its ending-phase, the relationship appeared to enter a more chaotic phase:

> Our rapport had become complicated—she seemed suddenly so dense—by the increasing presence of indelible emotions that seemed bent on destroying the harmony and illuminating insights that nevertheless still kept coming. Then, I rationalized these perceptions by attending mainly to what we were achieving. Today, looking back through my yellow-tinted lens, I believe that what was also being achieved—besides the evident yellow illumination—was actually a thorough spoiling of the white harmony which her emotions and my perceptions were clearly indicating, a spoiling which my own analytic whiteness resisted and tried to smooth over. (Hillman, 1991, p.91)

The "the white harmony" of the previous highly syntonic analytic relationship was now being spoiled. Newly problematic differentiations of feeling emerged breaking up the albedo collusions—feelings of merger—that had hitherto been taken for granted. Importantly, Hillman notes his own resistance to the process and acknowledges the temptation to hang onto a "smooth" albedo (personality No. 2) dimension of the therapy for as long as possible. Looking back, however, he can see that this yellow "spoiling" was a necessary stage in the termination of the therapy.

I would also suggest that Hillman's introduction of the clinical illustration not only serves a rhetorical point, in that it supplies the reader with an amplification of motifs and insights which, according to his argument, characterise the yellowing, but it also performs a yellowing of its own, in that the entry of the outer other (the client) into the paper has the effect of spoiling the aesthetic euphony of Hillman's sometimes all-too-clever and all-too-learned fine writing. The patient's embodied presence cannot but make itself felt as "other" to Hillman's hitherto dominant voice. Hillman's crafted paradoxes now begin to seem precious

and finicky. As readers, we are forced into an encounter with *her*, a living and breathing person. She may have been introduced as an example, but the fullness of her personhood transcends the limitations of exemplarity.

Hillman's paper derives from a period in his intellectual evolution in which he made an overt attempt to move psychology beyond what he saw as the navel-gazing of individual personal development and by shifting our attention "from mirror to window" to achieve a connection with "the world."[8] Hillman describes the project in this way:

> [A]s the alchemical opus rescues the soul of the individual, so this opus can rescue the psyche of psychology conceived only in terms of the individual human. From the alchemical perspective the human individual may be a necessary focus but cannot be a sufficient one; the rescue of the cosmos is equally important. Neither can take place without the other. Soul and world are inseparable: anima mundi. It is precisely this fact that the yellowing makes apparent and restores, a fact which the white state of mind cannot recognize because that mind has unified into itself the world, all things psychologized. (Hillman, 1991, p.91)

On the face of it, Hillman seems to be describing both problem and solution in a way that chimes with the argument of this book. Unfortunately, however, Hillman's attempts to free himself from the limitations he rightly observes in Jung's inward-facing psychology have the effect of embedding him more deeply within it. This is because, as the passage above makes clear, he diagnoses the problem as an overfocus on the individual person within psychology. Hillman's solution is to prioritise instead what he calls "soul"—autonomous imaginal activity untethered from the actual person.

By identifying world with *anima mundi,* Hillman makes a move in the direction of Neoplatonic idealism, and this inevitably takes him away from engagement with the "other" (i.e., whatever lies "outside"). Hillman thus exacerbates Jung's own problematic separation of archetypal and personal; in effect, he severs the transcendental (personality No. 2) Jung—

who prioritises image—from the immanent (personality No. 1) Jung—who is embedded in that relational network that constitutes world. This wrong turn involves Hillman in attempting to reconnect with "world" by waging a war on "ego-psychology" (Hillman, 1992a, p.48) and the "subjective." (Hillman 1992b, pp.93–94)

Hillman's "yellowing" turn toward the world reveals a genuine recognition of the need to reconnect with the "outside." However, by making Jung's identification of image and psyche into a core principle, Hillman also makes it impossible for this "outside" to function as genuinely exterior. As we have seen, such a psyche cannot genuinely meet the world; it can only introject it.

Wolfgang Giegerich's variant on Analytical Psychology, "Psychology as a discipline of interiority," marks an escalation in the decoupling of "soul" and person that Hillman's archetypal psychology pioneered.[9] We can gain a sense of how radically untethered Giegerich's psychology is from actual persons in the world when we look at the definition of "psyche" presented at the website of The International Society for Psychology as the Discipline of Interiority:

> [T]he psyche is not only the object of psychological investigation, but at the same time, and recursively so, its subject. Having no point of perspective outside the psyche to view it from objectively and no substrate or pre-suppositional base in anything more substantial, literal, or positively existing, a truly psychological psychology, it follows, must be internal to itself, a discipline of internal reflection. ('A Definitional Statement' n.d.)

In more ways than one, this approach takes to its logical conclusion a tendency that we have identified as active in Jung writings, whereby the personal is radically differentiated from the archetypal, thus achieving a compartmentalisation of personality No. 1 and personality No. 2.[10] Giegerich not only achieves a once-and-for-all radical scission between the world of Jung's personality No. 2 and the world of personality No. 1, *he deliberately banishes the latter from the realm of psychology*.

Wotan

By maintaining a *cordon sanitaire* between the realms of the two personalities, Jung preemptively erases the possibility of inhabiting the creative tension between the two. I shall now focus upon the implications of this strategy by looking at two contrasting examples of Jung's approach.

The question of Jung's problematic response to the rise of Nazism in Germany in the 1930s has, for good reasons, tended to be subsumed into questions about his anti-Semitism or sympathy with fascism. Although I would like to approach it here from a rather different direction, I hope that this approach will shed some light on those issues, too.

Jung's essay "Wotan" (Jung, 1936c) (first published in the *Neue Schweizer Rundschau*) gives us the most elaborated version of Jung's approach to the German Revolution. In it, Jung imagines the German *volk* to be his patient and takes up the role of psychotherapist to the nation. Faced with an ordinary patient, Jung takes into account the conscious, objective situation of his client but also listens to the voice of the unconscious, in the form of dreams or active imaginations, and he encourages the patient to do the same. Such a patient may well find himself or herself in a place of great conflict, especially when undergoing major transitions such as the so-called midlife crisis. When dealing with such crises, Jung tends to invoke what he calls the problem of the opposites. This means that the patient is required to stay in touch with the conflict and endure the tension between the opposites until such time as a solution emerges that can enable the patient to find a new conscious perspective. This process is what Jung refers to as the transcendent function (Jung, 1916d). If, however, the patient rejects one of the opposites as unacceptable, irrational, or immoral, such a process cannot occur, and the result is that the patient's neurotic one-sidedness is perpetuated.

It is in the nature of the unconscious that it will produce images, ideas, and emotions that feel unacceptable to the conscious ego. Healing, however, involves conscious engagement with precisely these images, ideas, and emotions. It is this therapeutic approach that, in his Wotan essay, Jung takes toward his patient, the German people. Jung's diagnosis is that, for various reasons including a relatively superficial, conscious identification on the one hand with Christian values and on the other

with Enlightenment values, Germans have in later modernity become neurotically one-sided. In such a situation, as Jung puts it in an earlier text, the unconscious "seeks to replace an attitude of a whole people that has become inadequate with a new one." (Jung, 1920, para. 597) Jung discerns in the collective psyche of the German people a revivification of unconscious forces that have simmered beneath the surface of its culture for centuries. In this essay, Jung takes the step of identifying the most powerful of these forces with Wotan, the ancient high god of the Teutonic tribes. Through this mythological parallel, Jung intends to amplify the explosion of primitive energy he now sees occurring within the race-psyche of the Germans. Like the god Wotan himself, this primitive energy is so far from civilised consciousness that it tends to be rejected (especially by non-Germans) as thoroughly unacceptable.

Jung's thesis is that in 1930s Germany, the historical/cultural form this primitive Wotanic resurgence has taken is that of the rise of Hitler and the Nazi party. However distasteful these events may be to the (one-sided hyperrational) consciousness of modern Europe, they are, in Jung's professional opinion, psychologically necessary in the same way that, in the case of an ordinary patient, primitive shadow components are required for a healthy rebalancing of the whole psyche. In short, they compensate one-sidedness. Any diagnosis of the German situation that does not take into account the psychological importance of these unconscious and irrational forces, and insists on utilising only economic, political, and psychological interpretations, will, as Jung sees it, necessarily fail to grasp the situation on a sufficiently profound level and therefore will miss the fundamental point of what is occurring. As Jung puts it, "The unfathomable depths of Wotan's character explain more of National Socialism than all … reasonable factors put together" (Jung, 1936c, para. 385).

This analysis of the collective individuation process of the German people also involves Jung in interpreting what appear to be conscious choices (such as the election of Hitler as chancellor) as mere symptoms of unconscious possession by the Wotan archetype. It follows, according to Jung's argument, that the German people (qua patient) is not to be regarded as the perpetrator of dangerous and immoral actions but rather as the *victim* of autonomous phenomena taking place within a necessary

depth-psychological process (Jung, 1936c, para. 398). As is often the case for a person undergoing individuation, the process sometimes takes on a highly regressive tone. However, Jung suggests, what the onlooker may mistake for a dangerous reversion to primitivity is for the Germans the kind of temporary backward move that always presages a forward leap. As Jung puts it, "Wotan's reawakening is a stepping back into the past; the stream was dammed up and has broken into its old channel. But the obstruction will not last for ever; it is rather a *reculer pour mieux sauter*, and the water will overleap the obstacle." (Jung, 1936c, para. 399)

There are numerous problems with Jung's argument here, most of which I have no space to go into.[11] I shall therefore narrow the discussion down to a particular problem that relates closely to the discussion that has taken up the first half of this chapter. In brief, my suggestion is that Jung's treatment of the Wotan question offers us a particularly clear example of the kind of difficulty we have seen surfacing in his treatment of individual patients. This difficulty is intimately bound up with Jung's insistence on segregating the personal from the archetypal, prioritising the latter and obviating communication between the two. Jung thereby fails to do justice to the psycho-logic of the two personalities, which, as we have seen, points toward the fact that it is precisely the conflict, tension, and communication between the two realms that creates conditions necessary for psychic transformation. There is more to be said about this. However, before doing so, it will be helpful to shift our focus from world affairs to Jung's actual clinical practice. I intend to examine Jung's treatment of one particular patient, whose case vividly illustrates where Jung's policy of segregating the archetypal from the personal can lead.

Jung and His Patients

As we have seen, Jung's theoretical reflections on the subject of psychotherapy highlight the importance of mutual connection and influence between both partners, analyst and analysand. He thus clearly implies that the therapeutic event involves a complex interweaving of both conscious relations and unconscious transference and countertransference dynamics—i.e., of both inner and outer factors. However, Jung's actual therapeutic practice (as we can see both from his own accounts and from

those of his patients) seems to have led him to maintain a radical separation between personal and archetypal aspects of the therapy.

In his 1935 Tavistock Lectures, Jung makes a clear distinction between the way he treats material that emerges from the *personal* unconscious and the way he approaches the products of the *collective* unconscious. In order to illustrate the first category, Jung gives an example of a patient presenting Jung with a dream containing an image of water. Since this is supposedly an image from the *personal* unconscious, Jung brings to bear an attitude of not knowing, reminiscent of Keats's negative capability, on the grounds that this is the approach that best elicits associations embedded in the context of the client's particular life. He asks the patient what his particular associations to water may be:

> Do I know what he means by 'water'? Not at all. When I put the test word or a similar word to somebody, he will say 'green'. Another one will say 'H_20', which is something quite different. Another one will say 'quicksilver' or 'suicide'. In each case I know what tissue that word or image is embedded in. (Jung, 1935c, para. 174)

However, confronted by dream material that he judges to be a product of the *collective* unconscious, Jung takes a completely different tack, enlisting a process he calls "amplification," which is intended to place the material in a wider archetypal context but which often entails, as Robin McCoy Brooks puts it, "a formulaic reduction of the expanded material to a presumed archetypal core." (Brooks, 2013, p.87) In this latter case, far from employing an approach of not knowing, Jung employs his understanding of the archetypal/symbolic world to make strong suggestions to the client as to the psychological meanings of the dream images in question. Jung feels authorised by his assumption that the transpersonal unconscious is shared by both client and analyst to impose his own interpretations (based upon his extensive knowledge of myth, fairy tale, etc.) on the material. In the example given in the Tavistock lecture, Jung mentions the image of a crab that has occurred in a patient's dream:

> [T]he crab is not a personal experience, it is an archetype. When an analyst has to deal with an archetype he may begin to think … [I]nasmuch as [the client] is not a person, inasmuch as he is also myself, he has the same basic structure of mind, and there I can begin to think, I can even provide him with necessary context because he will have none, he does not know where that crab-lizard comes from and has no idea what it means, but I know and can provide the material for him. (Jung, 1935c, para. 190)

What is happening here is that Jung is imposing upon his clients a rigid hermeneutic template, albeit a template derived from Jung's own experiences.

For Example, Christiana Morgan

I now want to take a closer look at the way Jung dealt with one of his own clinical cases, that of Christiana Morgan. Morgan, a talented and intelligent American woman of 28, arrived in Zurich in June 1926. Although she was accompanied by her husband, she was following in the steps of her lover, Henry Murray (also married).

As it happened, Murray had himself arrived in Zurich for analysis with Jung a year earlier. According to Morgan's biographer, Claire Douglas, Murray's analysis had begun with a "long" session, during which Jung explained his marital and romantic situation. In turn, Jung, utilising ideas to be found in his recently published "Marriage as a psychological relationship," (Jung, 1925b)

> told Murray not only about his theory of the uncontained partner in a marriage needing to roam, and about the different types of women, the mother and hetaira, but … also about his personal life. Jung spoke of Emma Jung as filling the role of wife and mother for him, while Toni Wolff filled that of lover, mystical sister, and muse. Jung suggested that such an arrangement was difficult but possible and for some men psychologically advantageous. It had risks… but if handled honestly and clearly,

and if Harry was up to it, it would only add to his creativity. (Douglas, 1997b, p.132)

When Christiana Morgan arrived in Zurich, she began an analysis with Jung that lasted from June to November 1926. There are several aspects to the analysis that I would like to draw attention to.

Douglas tells us that Morgan suffered with a father complex that left her with a tendency to look to older men to solve her problems. Her pattern was to idealise older men and seek their love by excelling in their world.[12] Not surprisingly, this pattern became powerfully reconstellated in the context of Morgan's analytic relationship with Jung. We can, of course, not know exactly what Jung felt toward his patient and least of all how he responded to her on an unconscious level. However, Morgan's account of her therapy with Jung indicates that her own idealising transference was met by a kind of anima-dominated countertransference.

Such an event would certainly not be surprising, given what we know of Jung's previous relationships with Preiswerk, Spielrein, Wolff, and, as we have seen, more recently with Reichenstein. Under these circumstances, we might have expected that the work of consciously unpicking these tangled mutual transference projections would have become Jung's focus in the therapy. Unfortunately, as Douglas puts it, "Jung never adequately dealt with [Morgan's] idealization of her father or himself." (Douglas, 1997b, p.149) Nor do we have any evidence that Jung was aware of his own countertransference reactions.

Instead, what seems to have developed is a powerful unconscious collusion between analyst and patient. On the one hand, this made "Morgan extremely receptive to all that Jung said," and on the other, Jung's "attraction for her made him willing to give her extra time and energy." (Douglas, 1997b, p.149) Jung instructed Morgan "to live her life very much in the same way Toni Wolff lived hers—as adjunct to and in the service of her lover," (Douglas, 1997b, p.150) telling her, "Your function is to create a man … so you become a really wise woman a *femme inspiratrice*—and so you give to man what he has not." (Douglas, 1997b, p.151) Here we can clearly see Jung attempting to impose upon Morgan an "archetypal" template that, as he understood it, fitted both his own experience and his

psychological theory. Unfortunately, as the analysis continued, Morgan began to increasingly experience this template as a straitjacket.

The Visions

Jung considered Morgan's visions to be so interesting that he made them the subject of a four-year seminar, which took place four years after Morgan had left Zurich. A transcript of this seminar, which was attended by Jungian insiders, was privately published in 1957, republished in two volumes by Spring Publications in 1976 (Jung, 1976), and finally in 1997 given a scholarly edition (also in two volumes) in Princeton Press's Bollingen imprint (Jung, 1997).

In 1926, the practice of active imagination had only recently been introduced to Zurich. Morgan was "encouraged by Jung and by Toni Wolff" (Douglas 1997b, p.155) to take it up, and she began to produce visions that were immediately recognised as outstanding. As Douglas (the editor of the Bollingen edition of the Visions seminars) tells us (though without apparently realising the transferential implications of her statement), "Christiana came up with an unprecedented production of artistic and imaginative archetypal material *just when this was the very stuff that would most interest her doctor,*" (Douglas, 1997b, p.156. My italics) We are not entirely surprised when Douglas goes on to tell us, "Jung warmed to Morgan at this point, treating her with unusual delicacy and care. He welcomed her as a rare companion who explored the depths he, too, had sounded. … [He] paid a great deal of attention to Christiana, changing his schedule so that he could see her almost daily." (Douglas, 1997b, p.158) This latter detail is very striking, given that, at this time, Jung's time and attention were in great demand. Clearly, whatever else they may have been, Morgan's visions were offerings to Jung that constituted highly successful attempts to maintain herself in his gaze and thereby to stand out in a very crowded field.

Of course, Jung's fascination with Morgan's visions was contingent upon the assumption that they were channelling archetypal/symbolic material. Neither Jung nor his followers seem to have evinced any doubt that active imagination is a reliable means to produce such material in a particularly pure form, uncontaminated by personal considerations. This

was presumably because Jung's own experience during his confrontation with the unconscious left him with a high degree of confidence in the technique. Given that his whole psychology was based upon the need to maintain psychic health by accessing the unconscious, it was perhaps inevitable that active imagination, a process by which conscious and unconscious were enabled to make direct contact, should be held up as a primary technique. However, given that the technique involves a highly conscious engagement between the "personal" ego and "impersonal" unconscious material, it seems likely that a certain amount of cross-contamination between the "personal" realm and the "archetypal" realm would occur. If so, then the assumption that the material produced is purely "archetypal" begins to seem naïve. In Morgan's case, as we shall see, the assumption is shown to be particularly problematic.

As we have already seen, Jung was well aware that "in the deepest sense we all dream not out of ourselves but out of what lies between us and the other." (Jung, 1973b, p.172) The clear implication is that dreams do not represent a private unconscious realm belonging to the dreamer alone but are, on the contrary, constellated out of a complex interplay among the personal, relational, cultural and archetypal. If this is true for dreams, then it is also true for active imaginations produced in the clinical context.

What complicated matters in 1926 was that Morgan's positive transference to Jung provided her with a powerful incentive to provide the kind of material that Jung would find interesting. In order to retain Jung's ongoing attention and positive regard, such material would have to be produced not only once but repeatedly. What is more, the material in question would need to be expressed in precisely the "archetypal" form that Jung found most fascinating. By producing weekly or even daily episodes of such a narrative, Morgan, Scheherazadelike, could thus perpetually defer the moment when she would lose Jung's attention, and thus end the therapy that seemed to offer so much. On Jung's side, the anima problem that we have seen in his relationships with Preiswerk, Spielrein, Moltzer, Wolff and Reichstein evidently continued to be active in 1926.

Our faith in the purely archetypal nature of Morgan's active imaginations is further diminished when we read that she was "coached"

in the technique by Robert Edmond Jones, who had arrived in Zurich shortly before Morgan.[13] Jones, together with Morgan and her husband, "discussed their creations intensely among themselves." Such discussions occurred in situations "where … other analysands … could not help but overhear. They would greet each other in the streets of Zurich with cries of 'How's your Indian?' 'Are you still in the cavern?' or 'What's your magician up to today?'" Jones would ask Morgan directive questions like, "Ah, but is it dark enough? Is it deep enough? Is it black? It must be dark, darker!" (Douglas, 1997b, p.155)

This is in marked contrast with Jung's description of active imagination as an interior journey to be undergone in deepest solitude (though as I have shown, even those experiences had a far more relational aspect than Jung admitted). At the very least, they highlight a conscious, and even collective, dimension in the visions. One could make the case that they are not so much documents of the collective unconscious as they are communications from the hothouse culture of 1920s Jungian Zurich.

The important point is that Jung resolutely ignored the relevance of these "external" factors, persisting in his assumption that because the archetypal transcends the personal, it could therefore be treated as a separate, more important realm. This assumption led him to overlook the fuller context - both personal and cultural—within which such products emerged.

The Climax of a *folie à deux*

Apparently blind to the intensity and significance of Morgan's transference, Jung seems to have remained oblivious to the inflationary potential of his words to her. He encouraged her to follow directly in his own footsteps, telling her, "I would advise you to put it all down as beautifully and as carefully as you can—in some beautifully bound book." (Douglas, 1997b, p.159) As Morgan's visions reached their climax, Jung told her that they were a sacrament holding "material for the next two or three hundred years. It is a great *document humaine*. It is the rushing forth of all that has hitherto been unconscious." (Douglas, 1997b, p.161)

The excitement constellated by the resulting inflation merely disguised Jung's inability or unwillingness to see through and make conscious the powerfully mutual transference/countertransference developments that lay behind it. Had Jung been able to bring these interpersonal dynamics into creative tension with what he saw as an archetypal evolution within Morgan, he might yet have achieved the kind of mutual transformation that he was later to describe in *The Psychology of the Transference*.

Douglas tells us that as time passed the imagery in Morgan's visions began to render her "in assertive and aggressive activity that sometimes troubled her interpreter." (Douglas, 1997a, p.xvi) Douglas suggests that Jung had both personal and cultural difficulties with these images and, as a result, dismissed such unfeminine characteristics as merely a product of a negative animus. By persisting in bringing such material to Jung, Morgan might have been expressing her own aggression toward her analyst. By expressing the other "negative" pole to her unrealistically "positive" transference onto Jung, Morgan implicitly challenged the mutual collusion that had arisen between them.

From what we read in Morgan's accounts of her sessions with Jung, nothing of this kind was discussed. The only way that Jung could have explored these dynamics would have been to bring together the personal (transference) dimension and the impersonal (archetypal) dimension. Given Jung's fixed idea that the personal and the archetypal occupied radically different dimensions such an analysis inevitably remained unavailable.

The analysis laboured increasingly under the complexities of Morgan's unconscious transference reactions that inflamed and were in turn inflamed by Jung's own countertransference. The result was a full-blown *folie á deux,* which, as Douglas points out with devastating understatement, "ultimately detracted from [Morgan's] therapeutic progress." (Douglas, 1997b, 149)

Eventually (and in retrospect unsurprisingly), the analysis simply unraveled. Unable or unwilling to consciously address the possible transference meanings bound up in Morgan's visions' imagery, Jung seems to have begun to act out some of the unconscious dynamics that

had developed between them. Having first encouraged Morgan's relationship with her lover, Murray, Jung "now started to sound jealous, as if the force unleashed in the visions belonged to him." (Douglas, 1997b, p.163) He then attempted "to restrain the flow of Morgan's images … suggesting that she buy an etymological dictionary and take up the study of the mythic parallels of her visions." (Douglas, 1997b, p.164) Next, he resorted to deflating the specialness of her visions by comparing them unfavourably to his own (Douglas, 1997b, p.165). Finally, he "suggested that she drop all the inner work she was doing and settle down and have another child." (Douglas, 1997b, p.166) As Douglas tells us, "[Morgan] was still immersed in her visions and still hadn't resolved many of her analytic issues but agreed with his suggestion; her analysis came to an end in early November." (Douglas, 1997b, p.168)[14]

The Limits of Interpretation

In Doug las' account of this episode, Morgan's visions are represented as an unfolding depiction of "a fully engendered woman reclaiming all the possibilities inherent in her psyche." (Douglas, 1997a, p.xvi) Douglas's argument involves her in portraying the visions as a pure and authentic outpouring of Morgan's unconscious. She expertly reveals how Jung's imposition of the conventional aspects of his anima concept on Morgan worked like a kind of Procrustean bed, giving her no psychic space in which to open up "a new path in search of a more comprehensive feminine identity." (Douglas, 1997a, p.xxv) However, although Douglas criticises Jung for having failed to honour the full range of Morgan's creative imagination, she seems to share Jung's faith in the archetypal authenticity of the visions. Douglas acknowledges that the visions emerged in the context of a powerful field of transference/countertransference, and she recognises that for Jung "to deny the influence of all these personal currents was naïve." (Douglas, 1997a, p.xxiii) However, she holds back from acknowledging that the *context* of the visions might have made a real contribution to the shaping of their *content*.

As we have seen, Jung saw archetypal material as occupying a category radically segregated from the personal. During his therapy with Morgan, this approach authorised Jung to explain to her the symbolic

meanings of her imagery without any reference to the personal context of their production (which, in this case, meant the transference-dominated situation out of which they had emerged). Jung's interpretations of the content of her visions, as Morgan reports them, take what we can immediately recognise as an orthodox "Jungian" form:

> The men against the wheel means the beginning of individuation. The 8 spokes here are the eight functions. The wheel is a very ancient symbol for the soul. … The moon & arrow is spirituality through sexuality. The wigwam is the abode of the primitive hence symbolizes the unconscious. (Douglas, 1997b, p.157)

When, four years later, Jung started to utilise Morgan's material in his Zurich seminars, many of his interpretations, severed as they were from the transferential and personal context, took on a similarly formulaic tone. Apparently, after several years of this, the seminar members began to become "restive." Douglas reports that they increasingly took every opportunity to distract themselves by pursuing alternative topics (Douglas, 1997a, p.xxiv). Even Jung began to lose interest. By 1934, we find him telling his audience: "Now we will go on with the visions, which are in part annoying, or worse, they are boring . . . exceedingly uninteresting." (Jung, 1997, p.1310) It is hard not to suspect that if the visions were boring, it was probably because of Jung's insistence on reading them solely on the archetypal level. As Douglas puts it:

> By repressing the personal and dealing with Morgan's visions as if they were universals, the seminar itself began to take on the disembodied quality that Jung projected onto the visions and explained as Morgan's animus problem. And the further Jung departed from his patient and her material, the more he imposed abstract theories onto them, until, finally, the abstractions themselves and their theoretical implications obscured the visions and blotted out the visioner. (Douglas, 1997a, p.xxiv)

Anonymity

When Jung wrote in 1930 to ask Morgan's permission to use the visions in his English-speaking seminar, he admitted that he had already used them without her permission in a short German language seminar. He hastened to reassure her that her material had been used "from a purely impersonal point of view naturally, hiding any personal inferences." (Quoted in Shamdasani, 2005, p.114) There are two different difficulties with this statement. First, as we have suggested, to attempt to treat any psychic product as *purely* impersonal—i.e. to simply exclude the personal context—is arguably to subject the material to a fatal level of distortion. Second, given that this seminar was taking place a mere four years after Morgan's departure and given that Jungian Zurich was a hotbed of jealousies and rivalries, in which privacy was neither sought nor possible, Jung's suggestion that it would be possible for Morgan's material to remain safely anonymous seems absurdly optimistic. That Jung continued to have concerns about this issue is evident in a letter written to Morgan on August 15, 1932:

> Concerning the trances I am well aware of the personal side of it, but I carefully kept away from any hint to the personal implications. Otherwise people begin to find it too interesting and then they fall into the error to devour each others personal psychology instead of looking for themselves and learning the more difficult task of an impersonal attitude. There are some, quick enough to grasp something of the actual personal background and it is often difficult to keep them off the scent. Life on a personal level is the smaller affair, the higher level however is impersonal. And there is such a thing as responsibility to history. (Quoted in Shamdasani, 2005, p.114)

Here, Jung mixes up two quite different considerations: first, the quite proper requirement that Morgan's anonymity be prioritised; and second, his need to segregate the personal from the "impersonal," which he seeks to dignify with a grandiose invocation of his "responsibility to history." For all that, Jung put little actual effort into ensuring that Morgan remain

anonymous. In fact, by the time of Jung's letter, Morgan's anonymity had already been compromised. In late 1931, Ralph Eaton, a young philosopher and rejected ex-lover of Morgan's, arrived in Zurich to consult with Jung about his affair with Morgan. Invited by Jung to attend the Visions seminar, Eaton immediately recognised the identity of their author.[15] We should also remember that Toni Wolff, who had been analyst to Morgan's husband, was present throughout the seminar.

Despite the incestuous nature of the proceedings, the seminar continued for another two years before Morgan, angry and upset at the fact that her identity had become common knowledge, insisted that Jung terminate it. Not surprisingly, Jung's attempt to utilise Morgan's material "from a purely impersonal point of view … hiding any personal inferences" had failed. One can perhaps conclude that when the personal gets suppressed in favour of the archetypal in the way that Jung attempted, it tends to find a way to disrupt proceedings willy-nilly.

Back to the Split

In the published version of the seminars, Jung opens proceedings with this interesting comment:

> I omit personal details intentionally, because they matter so little to me. We are all spellbound by external circumstances, and they make our minds deviate from the real thing, which is that we ourselves are split inside. Appearance blinds us and we cannot see the real problem. (Jung, 1997, p.7)

Jung here identifies the "real problem" with a state of splitness. As we have seen, this was the issue that he himself had wrestled with throughout his early years, and it was also the problem that, as I have argued, subsequently evolved into the foundational question behind his whole psychology. Unfortunately, I would argue, he here exacerbates that very splitness by insisting upon a strict differentiation between "external circumstances" (here identified with "personal details") which he claims have no importance, and what really matters: "the real thing … the real problem." To be "spellbound" by the former, Jung suggests, is to be blind

to the latter. What Jung doesn't seem to be willing to entertain is the possibility that one might also become "spellbound" by an archetypal realm, untethered to the personal. In both cases, to be spellbound means to be one-sided. What Jung dismisses here as unimportant are precisely the No. 1 concerns which, according to the logic of *MDR*'s storm lantern dream, need to be brought into relational tension with the "deep" reality of No. 2. In other words, even if Jung is right to claim that the "real problem" is one of inner splitness, the solution (i.e., Jung's own solution) is not to segregate No. 1 from No. 2 by making a radical differentiation of the archetypal from the personal, but to find ways to bring the two together. In practice, this might mean allowing the "personal" transferential dimension of the therapy to enter a field of play in which it could meet with the "archetypal" imagery produced by active imagination, or rather to acknowledge that the two dimensions are always already in play.

It might be argued that Jung's primary goal in conducting the seminar in question was not to provide insight about the complexities of this or any other therapeutic process, but rather to concentrate upon amplifying the symbolic content of Morgan's visions and to offer thereby educational insights into archetypal phenomena. The problem with this argument is that by imposing a *cordon sanitaire* between archetypal content and the personal context within which that content had been constellated, Jung distorts the material in such a way that its educational potential becomes extremely limited.

What is Active Imagination?

I have questioned Jung's tendency to take Morgan's active imaginations as pure products of the collective unconscious, and I have suggested that a proper analysis of the "visions" would require not only an archetypal lens but both personal and cultural lenses, too. It follows that any really productive analysis of them would need to focus upon the interplay among personal, cultural, and archetypal elements. However, having acknowledged this much, the question that arises is this: If this is true of Morgan's active imaginations, then is the same not true of all active imaginations. If so, what of the creation myth of Jungian psychology, i.e., Jung's own confrontation with the unconscious? Surely, Jung's visions too

need to be approached as a complex interweave of personal, cultural, and archetypal factors.

As we saw in the last chapter, the figures whom Jung meets in his confrontation with the unconscious are dressed up with archaic mythological or Gnostic names and thus appear to emanate from the far reaches of the collective unconscious. What this disguises, according to Wolfgang Giegerich, is the extent to which, in *The Red Book*, Jung is engaging with the intellectual, cultural, and political world of 1913, and specifically with the spiritual situation of contemporary Christianity in the wake of Nietzsche. What I would add to this is the suggestion that, as we saw in the earlier discussion of dream of the killing of the hero, Jung is also simultaneously working through some of the more personal issues that arose in his relationships with Freud and Spielrein. If any of this is true, then Jung's attempt to represent *The Red Book* as purely an engagement with the spirit of the depths and a rejection of the spirit of this time is not only naïve but profoundly misleading. What we witness in *The Red Book* is, in fact, a meeting between Jung's conscious thinking and Jung's unconscious thinking, and the latter contains a complex mixture of personal, cultural, and archetypal factors. As such, it can only be understood if we are willing to recognise that each of these factors is embedded inextricably in the others.

Jung's image of and response to his anima tells us a great deal about 1) his personal relationships with specific women (as we have already explored), 2) his culturally bound responses to women and the feminine, and 3) a personified contra-ego that opens Jung's eyes to those aspects of the psyche that transcend the limitations of the ego. None of these three has priority over the others, and each is bound up with both the others. If we understand the personal and cultural aspects as belonging to personality No. 1 and the archetypal as belonging to personality No. 2, then what becomes clear is that any real insight can only come from the interplay between both personalities.

And Back to Wotan

I now want to return to a topic that would, at first glance seem, unrelated to the ins and outs of Jung's analysis of Christiana Morgan and

her visions: Jung's attempts to provide a depth psychological analysis of contemporary events in 1930s Germany. However, if we place the two together, we can see that Jung's treatment of both brings about similar problems for very similar reasons. In the Wotan essay, Jung insists first that the mythological dimension of the issue should be seen as entirely separate from any historical/social/economic dimensions—in much the same way, and for the same reasons that in his therapeutic practice he seems to have compartmentalised archetypal and personal. Second, in both cases Jung prioritises the former and implicitly devalues the latter, an approach that seems to echo his treatment elsewhere of the realms of personality No. 2 and personality No. 1.

The extreme dichotomy that Jung establishes in the Wotan essay between the historical/social/economic dimension and the mythological dimension also recalls the way Jung in *The Red Book* dealt with the First World War and its causes. There, Jung suggested that current events should be approached not via the "spirit of this time," utilising the kind of rational approach to be found in historical discourse (characterised by Jung as "explaining and ordering things" [Jung, 2009, p.229]) but rather via the irrational "spirit of the depths," which, he claims, rules "the depths of everything contemporary" (Jung, 2009, p.229) and which is, according to Jung, "beyond justification, use, and meaning." (Jung, 2009, p.229) We can see another parallel to this approach in Jung's controversial comments during the 1930s on the differences between what he calls "Jewish psychology" (i.e., psychoanalysis) and German psychology (i.e., Analytical Psychology). Jung represents the former as possessing a "materialistic, rationalistic view of the world" (Jung, 1973b, pp.164–65) and as having therefore lost the connection to the creative depths of the soul, while he portrays the latter as uniquely able do justice to the "creative powers of the psyche labouring at the future; not just a dreary fragment but the meaningful whole." (Jung, 1934c, para. 354)[16]

At any rate, in all three of these examples, Jung sets up a clear dichotomy, in which one of the pair is highlighted as valuable and the other rejected as valueless. At no point does Jung appear to entertain the possibility that a more comprehensive understanding might be gained by bringing both of these apparently contradictory approaches together.

When it comes to Jung's attempt to account for the rise of Hitler, despite an insistence that he is providing a solely mythological approach, he does nonetheless assume a broadly historical context for the return of Wotan, although the history in question is in the service of a (Jungian) logic of compensation. The historical narrative that Jung likes to emphasise is one in which the dominant rationalism of the Enlightenment, with its emphasis upon consciousness, has, in the modern world, constellated an enantiodromic compensatory shift toward the dark unconscious psychic forces that Wotan expresses. As George Williamson among others has shown, post-Romantic, anti-Enlightenment, ideas, and specifically ideas highlighting Germanic mythology, were, throughout the 19th century, persistently intertwined with reactionary movements, nationalism, and even anti-Semitism (Williamson, 2004).

If Jung had taken a more nuanced approach toward the complex ebbs and flows that have characterised the history of modern German culture i.e., an approach that *engaged with* that history rather than rejecting it out of hand—he might perhaps have taken a more ambivalent attitude toward those energies he identifies with Wotan. He seems to have believed that his mythological/archetypal perspective on the phenomenon of the Nazi revolution offered him an objective view on what was occurring. Unfortunately, what it actually meant was that Jung, knowingly or not, was, in Walter Benjamin's words, supplying "auxiliary services to National Socialism." (Benjamin and Scholem, 1980, p.197) Moreover, defences of Jung's actions based upon the idea that he was merely a man of his time and that we are therefore critiquing his position from an anachronistic position, founder when we read Benjamin's words, which were written in 1937 (and those of, for example, Thomas Mann in 1935).[17]

Had Jung been able to bring the historical dimension into tension with the archetypal, he might also have achieved a far more fruitful analysis of to the question and one that furthered the psycho-logic of the two personalities.[18]

ENDNOTES

[1] The best treatment of this subject is to be found in David Sedgwick's *The Wounded Healer: Countertransference from a Jungian Perspective* (Sedgwick, 1994)

[2] In *Symbols of Transformation* (Jung 1912/1952), Jung uses the visions of "Miss Miller," (which he had found in a 1905 article in Flournoy's *Archives de Psychologie*); in "Psychology and Alchemy," he analyses the dreams of Wolfgang Pauli, whose case, as we shall see, he had deliberately handed over to another analyst. Even the famous "Solar Phallus Man" was not one of Jung's patients.

[3] Perhaps, in truth, a more important consideration behind Jung's prophylactic attempts with Pauli was that of scientific plausibility: If Jung could show that Pauli's dreams (like, for example, the mythology of an obscure Amazonian tribe) were produced outside of Jung's influence, then they would function more effectively as evidence of the truth of Jung's claims. Hillman suggests that Jung's efforts were meant to ensure "that the demonstration of his theory by means of the case [should be] yet more objectively empirical." (Hillman, 2012, p.32) However, even this consideration doesn't seem to make much sense, since it would always be Jung's interpretations of the dreams that were under scientific scrutiny, rather than the dreams themselves

[4] Jung was drawn to alchemy for several different reasons, including its imaginal richness, its linguistic complexity, its obscurity, and its paradoxicality. However, his central thesis is that alchemy performs a shadow role with regard to Christianity that is corrective of one-sidedness in the same way as that of Analytical Psychology (according to Jung) within modern Western culture. This involves it in "redeeming" topics that have been rejected by the dominant culture, such as the

feminine, evil, and matter. It utilises the premodern paradigm of *correspondence*, whereby macrocosm reflects and is reflected by microcosm. As the alchemical nostrum tells us, "As above so below." Such a paradigm predates the subject/object split of Descartes and the scientific perspective of modernity and overcomes (or ignores) the conceptual compartmentalisation of inner versus outer. As von Franz puts it, "[for the alchemists] the major part of what we call today the psyche was located outside the individual in the animated matter of the universe." (von Franz, 1992, p.177)

[5] Roger Brooke approaches this issue from a different (phenomenological) direction but comes to a similar conclusion: for example, he describes Jung's theories of synchronicity and of the *unus mundus* as "a magical attempt on Jung's part to jump over the chasm that his separation of subject and object had already created." (Brooke, 2015, p.14, n. 3)

[6] This work has been attempted in various ways by various different post-Jungian thinkers. Nathan Schwartz-Salant (Schwartz-Salant, 1998), Mario Jacoby (Jacoby, 1984) and Andrew Samuels (Samuels, 2006) have, in different ways attempted to spell out and develop Jung's alchemical intuitions in a specifically clinical setting. In an interesting paper bringing together Jung and Marx, David Holt has suggested that, for Jung, alchemy "belongs in the world of extraversion as well as of introversion, and … its extraverted mode is expressed in the intercourse between man and nature …" (Holt, 1992, p.141)

[7] It is important to note that Hillman's essay "The Yellowing of the Work," was written at a point when he was turning away from a style of post-Jungian psychology that he felt had become too inward-looking, and attempting to extend his ideas outward, into the world. I introduce Hillman's personal equation and its vicissitudes here in an attempt to bring the personal into binocular play with the theoretical; it should not be seen as a reduction of one to the other.

[8] For more developed presentations of this project, see Hillman's "Anima Mundi: The Return of the Soul to the World" (Hillman, 1982) and "From Mirror to Window: Curing Psychoanalysis of Its Narcissism." (Hillman, 1989)

[9] In fact, Giegerich himself identifies Hillman's paper on the "Yellowing of the Work" as offering support to his own emphasis upon *thinking* as the proper activity of soul: "My move from ontology and the pure imagination to logic corresponds to the emphasis on the intellectual (logical) form or status that Hillman, in his paper on the yellowing of the Work, relying on a statement by the alchemist Dorneus, correlates with the yellowing phase." (Giegerich, 1994, p.323)

[10] In a previous article I suggested that by putting this differentiation at the center of his psychology, Giegerich was taking a step away from the Jungian tradition (Saban, 2015). It now seems to me that in fact Giegerich's psychology of interiority is all too true to Jung in ways that I had failed to see at that time and that it therefore functions as a kind of *reductio ad absurdum* of an important aspect of Jung's psychology.

[11] These problems include, among others: 1) Jung's assumption that collective psychology behaves in exactly the same way as individual psychology; 2) the consequent lifting of collective responsibility from Hitler and the Germans who supported him; 3) the uninterrogated assumption that a mythic figure embedded in an ancient cultural context could "return" and become active in a modern context, and the ignoring of the historical fact that the Nazis' ideology involved them in a conscious and deliberate embracing of exactly such parallels (a process that relied upon a complex and ongoing historical relationship between nationalism and a revisioned mythology, in figures such as Grimm and Wagner (see for example, Williamson, 2004); 4) Jung's assumption that there exists such a thing as an identifiable German race-psyche that is somehow independent of German culture as socially/historically constructed.

[12] Douglas tells us that Morgan "learned to attract [her father's] attention and please him. Even as a toddler she would run into him a breakfast and demand, 'Heed me, Papa,' as she climbed into his lap to talk." (Douglas, 1997b, p.33) She also informs us that "[Christiana] had a father complex, which kept her looking to strong and wise men to solve her

spiritual conflict in the same way she had looked to her father in childhood as the resolver of her problems." (Douglas, 1997b, p.146)

[13] Jones (1887-1954) was an American theatre designer, famous for his work with Eugene O'Neill

[14] Sonu Shamdasani, in the process of attempting to demolish Deirdre Bair's biography of Jung, also attacks Douglas's treatment of the Morgan case (Shamdasani, 2005, pp.112ff). In the face of Douglas's attempts to imply that there may have been sexual impropriety between Jung and Morgan (something I am not suggesting here), he attempts to show that Jung's behavior toward Morgan was proper and above board. In order to support his position, he quotes various letters from Morgan to Jung. In one, she apparently told Jung that "[s]he was not pleased that Peter Baynes had informed someone as to her identity, but ultimately had a sense that such experiences were not purely personal and belong to Jung and his work as much as to herself." (Shamdasani, 2005, p.114) In another, she informed "him of the gratitude in which she and Henry Murray held him. She informed him that it was through him, and in particular, his concept of the anima, that they found the "Way", and that they owed their creative life and joy to him." (Shamdasani, 2005, p.114) It seems naïve of Shamdasani to quote such letters as if they proved anything, other than Morgan's continuing desire to maintain Jung's approval. Morgan never seems to have entirely emerged from the idealising transference that accompanied her analysis with Jung. For example, having produced visions that echoed those in Jung's *Red Book*, Morgan went on to replicate Jung's Bollingen tower in New England (Douglas, 1997b, p.222). However, the fact that Morgan remained under Jung's influence cannot be used as evidence of either the effectiveness or the quality of Jung's therapeutic treatment. At any rate, the "creative life and joy" Morgan felt she owed to Jung was sadly not sufficient to avert her 1967 suicide (Douglas, 1997b, pp.313-5).

[15] Eaton, having himself become psychologically inflated by Jung's relentlessly archetypal interpretations of his material, returned to America in a full-blown psychosis and promptly killed himself (Douglas, 1997b, pp.209-10).

[16] We might speculate that, just as Jung's own anima problem, unrecognised, powerfully affected the progress of the Morgan case, so, in this example, his Freud-complex affected his ability to engage in a balanced way with the question of national psychologies.

[17] Mann wrote in his diary in 1935:

> If a highly intelligent man like Jung takes the wrong stand, there will naturally be traces of truth in his position that will strike a sympathetic note even in his opponents. ... His scorn for "soulless rationalism" has a negative effect only because it implies a total rejection of rationalism, when the moment has long since come for us to fight for rationality with every ounce of strength we have. Jung's thought and his utterances tend to glorify Nazism and its "neurosis." He is an example of the irresistible tendency of people's thinking to bend itself to the times—a high-class example . . . He swims with the current. He is intelligent, but not admirable. Anyone nowadays who wallows in the "soul" is backward, both intellectually and morally. The time is past when one might justifiably take issue with reason and the mind (Mann, 1982, pp. 201 and 235).

For this topic generally, see Jay Sherry's comprehensive *Carl Gustav Jung: Avant-Garde Conservative* (Sherry, 2012).

[18] As it happens, post-Jungians pursuing the idea of the cultural complex have attempted to cultivate a perspective that is more historically (and politically) aware, although, in my opinion the results have been hampered by an insufficiently acute awareness of two kinds of related problems: first, those associated, as we have seen with the one-sidedness of Jung's approach to current events; and second, the category problems that show up when intrapsychic dynamics are applied to the world historical stage (See Singer and Kimbles, 2004; and for a critique Lu, 2013).

perspective. The dogmatisation of Jung's psychology, and the obsessive revisiting of those themes that Jung favoured, is precisely not "realizing the ideal on one's own account." What thus gets missed (and thus erased) is what is essential in Jung's psychology: individuation as an interminable engagement with the other.

In a previous article, I enlisted Harold Bloom's contrast between weak misreadings and strong misreadings (Bloom, 1975) as an aid in thinking about the ways that Analytical Psychology can individuate (Saban, 2014). According to (my misreading of) Bloom, when I read any canonical work, my reading must inevitably be a misreading, since the reading consists of me meeting that work with my own assumptions, challenges, understandings—in other words, my own personal equation. However, the choice I can make is between performing a weak misreading, which will inevitably "have single, reductive, simplistic meanings," (Bloom, 1982, p.285) or a strong misreading whereby my reading owns its own partiality and goes on to create out of the encounter between it and me something new, strange, and complex.

According to Bloom's taxonomy, much of classical Jungian literature is offering a weak misreading of Jung. Because such a reading sets itself the unambitious task of clarifying or simplifying or merely re-presenting Jung's ideas, it fails to take on the challenge of engaging them creatively and thus fails to individuate them. The irony is that it thereby also fails to rise to the ideas themselves, which, according to Jung's own logic of individuation, need to meet and be brought into tension with whatever they lack. Unless Jung's ideas meet such a challenge, unless they are met by a strong misreading, they will calcify and die, or worse, become the dogma of a cult.

My goal here has been to present a strong misreading of Jung. However, ultimately it can only be *my* misreading. The best I can hope for from my readers is to be strongly misread in my turn. I therefore look forward to that challenge.

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