

Looking Backward: Archetypes in Reconstruction

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It is a commonplace view among Jungian analysts that archetypes are to be found and to some degree experienced in the transference. In one of his greatest papers, "On the psychology of the transference," Jung himself emphasized this understanding and showed how the complex relationship between analyst and analysand is fundamentally conditioned and informed by archetypal processes (1946). The archetypal process he described, the *coniunctio*, accounts for the healing that occurs in those analyses that show evidence of its constellation. Many other analyst-authors have followed this lead, and most Jungian discussions of the transference/countertransference process rely heavily on an archetypal perspective, whether they focus on the *coniunctio* or on a different constellation (cf. Schwartz-Salant and Stein, eds, 1984).

In vivid contrast to this, it has *not* been widely published that archetypes play an essential role in the therapeutic use of reconstruction. It is

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my contention that remembering and reconstructing the past, as this takes place within the context of analysis, can be as transformative and as deeply a part of the whole transformational process of therapy as the transference/countertransference process is, because reconstruction also rests upon and is informed by archetypal processes and factors.

A preliminary point needs to be made and underscored. Reconstruction can truly be done only within the transference, because the transference both makes the past deeply accessible and allows for the transformation of the analysand in the bipersonal field. Reconstruction, it should be noted, is essentially different from anamnesis or simple recollection of the past. It occurs piecemeal over the course of a long analysis and is put together bit by bit from emerging memories and interpretations. One might say that the analysand's personal history is constellated in the course of an analysis, and this constellation depends upon the energy of the transference/countertransference process. At the beginning of analysis, the full scope of the final picture is largely unknown by both analyst and analysand. An early anamnesis often leaves out the most essential parts of the history, the repressed and overlooked pieces, which will "pop out" and become prominent as the analysis proceeds.

Furthermore, an essential factor in the healing power of reconstruction is the role of the witness, the analyst. The story that is told and pieced together in analysis is told to, and partly by, a particular audience, the attentive analyst. The analyst is generically important as the constellator of the atmosphere in which the story emerges, and as the assistant in the task of reconstructing and understanding, but he or she is particularly important for bringing the most personal ingredients of this other psyche into the intimacy of analysis. Reconstruction of personal history in analysis emerges within the context of this relationship and the transference. Thus it is importantly different from writing an autobiography or relating a personal account of life to a neutral party, a biographer. The analyst hears and gets to know what the biographer rarely does, not only factually but also feelingly. The values and personal meanings assigned to specific persons and events are fully disclosed. The tone of each history is unique; the accents on persons and events are special; the details constantly shift in value until they find a resting place in the firmly woven tapestry of a life.

Analysis is continuous history-making, which calls for the active participation of both analyst and analysand. In the Jungian literature, however, there has been little rigorous discussion of the technique and place of reconstruction in analysis. Jung himself rarely uses the term. (Para-

graph 595 in *Collected Works*, volume 4, is the only instance noted in the *General Index*.) Occasionally he speaks of "recollection" in a vague and nontechnical way. Neither have later Jungian authors focused on reconstruction in analysis. Such standard texts as Edward Whitmont's *The Symbolic Quest*, June Singer's *Boundaries of the Soul*, Hans Dieckmann's *Methoden der Analytischen Psychologie*, and my own (edited) *Jungian Analysis* skirt this subject. Instead, the center of Jungian discussions of analytic practice has been occupied by consideration of various methods of interpretation and (lately) of the transference/countertransference process. Educational tools in therapy, such as amplification from myth and religion, and the various means available for evoking symbolic material—active imagination, sandplay, dance/movement, bodywork, painting—have found a place in the standard texts. Reconstruction, however, has been largely ignored. Only the English authors of the developmentalist orientation, particularly Michael Fordham and Kenneth Lambert, have given it more than passing attention.

This general neglect originated in Jung's divergence from Freudian technique and in his own differing theoretical interests. One of Jung's criticisms of Freud's early psychoanalysis was that it ran the risk—and often succumbed to it—of paying too much attention to patients' stories about childhood. In Jung's Fordham University lectures (1913) he criticised psychoanalysts for sometimes following their patients endlessly into the maze of their dubious meanderings and ruminations about childhood, thus getting lost in the neurosis themselves. By focusing so much on childhood and on the reconstruction of repressed "scenes from childhood," psychoanalysis was in danger of coming to resemble the neurotic diseases it was intended to cure. In this period, Jung regarded the most important cause of neurosis to be a person's unwillingness to face up to the emotional demands of the present. Analysis, therefore, should keep a careful eye on what the patient is shirking in the present and should interpret the patient's flights into childhood memory or into incestuous transference fantasies as evasions of the task at hand. Unless the patient manages to surmount this obstacle, neurosis will continue (1913, pars. 291–313). Jung here supported Freud in his movement away from the childhood trauma theory of neurosis.

With this attitude it was unlikely that he would give himself with great enthusiasm to the work of reconstruction. It was seen as a clever trap laid by the neurotic mind to divert attention from the real problem. To become caught up in endless remembrances of things past, not to mention the intensely intriguing possibility of "screen memories," would

play into the crafty patient's already too-well-developed tendency to evade the responsibilities of the present. Analysis would become mere woolgathering.

A second early trend in Jung's thinking that led him to look away from the role and value of reconstruction in analysis was his fascination with myth and symbol. In *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, written in 1912-13, Jung's overwhelming fascination with myth and symbol is apparent. This tendency was emphasized by many of Jung's followers. When archetypal themes are rendered in the literature of analytical psychology, one often hears little about a patient's "personal history." We are then in the territory of impersonal, or transpersonal, or archetypal psychology, where personal matters are not significant. The distinction between "personal" and "archetypal" has been used to create a breach between a person's history and the psyche, by dividing them into two separated realms of mental life. On the clinical level, then, the personal transference has sometimes been looked upon as a mere recapitulation of the childhood relationship with parents, whereas the archetypal transference has been considered as having to do with a relationship to the gods and grander meanings.

When put this starkly, of course, it becomes obvious that one is speaking of a complex and not a truth. The polarization between personal and archetypal elements of experience has been created by careless usage and thinking, but it has also been used for defensive purposes. To claim archetypality avoids the hazard of claiming personal responsibility. Jung himself does not actually polarize these dimensions either clinically or theoretically, nor do most practicing Jungian analysts, but the theory of analytical psychology can provide a handy means by which this kind of "complex thinking" can be fostered. As I will show later, Jung himself actually used a method of reconstruction in his clinical practice, and he certainly assumed it in his general discussions of the therapeutic process (cf. Stein 1985, ch. 2).

As a result of these two features of Jung's early thinking, the conscious utilization of reconstruction in analysis by Jungian analysts and the discussion of this method in the literature of analytical psychology have been badly neglected. While many, if not all, Jungian analysts actually practice some form of reconstruction—wittingly or unwittingly—every day and in almost every analytical hour, we have not reflected enough on this aspect of clinical work in our literature.

This may be so much the case that I should go no further without defining what I mean by the term "reconstruction." In the broadest and simplest sense, I am referring to the activity in analysis of telling and

hearing the life story of the analysand. In the more precise sense, this term refers to piecing together the *inner* history, the emotional life of the analysand, often with particular emphasis on childhood and on repressed memories, by using the means of dream interpretation, interpretation of the transference/countertransference dynamics, emerging memory images, and general theoretical understandings of development and psychodynamics.

Etymologically, reconstruction means to rebuild something by fitting the parts together. In the context of analysis, this means taking the bits of history as they emerge in the general course of analytic uncovering and piecing them together to show the shape of a coherent story.

When a person enters analysis and begins to speak personally about the present, it is not long before the historical antecedents come to the fore. Certain memories are associated; images of earlier times and places come to mind; dreams and experiences from childhood and adolescence are related to the analyst; the stories of relationships, work, significant moments are told. The person who comes to analysis today is prepared by our culture to begin to tell a personal story. This happens more or less automatically and without much prompting from the analyst. Then there are the dream figures who are embedded in earlier periods, and these bring associations from other, often long-forgotten, periods in the analysand's life. As time goes on and session follows session, the analyst gets an increasingly sharp picture of the analysand's psychological patterns and of how they have grown and developed in the past, as well as of how they operate in the present. The analyst's interpretations often take on an historical cast: This dream image or that transference reaction bears an uncanny resemblance to an earlier scene or relationship. In this fashion the present comes to be seen as a continuation, sometimes a repetition, of the past. When these kinds of continuity and repetition have been established such that even the subtlest feelings and emotional reactions and images, as they are experienced in the present, can be related to older, established themes, the work of reconstruction has been undertaken and to some extent completed. Lambert quotes Novey as saying that reconstruction is "an attempt . . . to see the patient and have him see himself in some continuing context in which his present modes of experiencing and dealing with himself and others are a logical outgrowth" (Lambert 1981, p. 115).

The reaction of Jungian analysts to this possible outcome of analysis has not been altogether receptive. In fact, they have raised still another objection to reconstruction, which might not have surfaced otherwise. Tying the present to the past in this way has seemed to some to be too re-

ductive. It has been argued that the psyche is not and should not be bound to history, any more than to logic or rationality or to the interpersonal field, for this would fetter its operations. Any such final connections of psyche to anything beyond itself and its ultimate freedom is too confining. By tying the psyche to history and to the patterns of thought and feeling that come about in the course of development, one places Psyche in Procrustes' bed. Reconstruction, it is felt, hampers the freedom of the psyche to soar, to create, to resurrect and begin again. History chains the soul to a corpse. The psyche is discontinuous, illogical, and free, as much as it is continuous, logical, and bound to the past. Therefore any attempt to create linkages between the operations of the autonomous psyche and its surroundings—interpersonal, cultural, historical—have been vehemently resisted by some. To these analysts, the possibilities of deconstruction in analysis are more appealing than the potentialities of reconstruction. For them the aim of analysis should be to free the soul from history, not to bind it further. This objection needs to be answered, for Jungian analysts still continue to practice reconstruction, often unwillingly or unwittingly—perhaps also rather poorly—simply because analysts take the lead or because this method has become a somewhat unconscious complex in the professional psyche of every practicing therapist.

My purpose in writing this paper is to bring this topic of reconstruction in analysis into focus and to reflect upon it from a Jungian viewpoint. By "Jungian viewpoint" I mean the theoretical apparatus of complex and archetypal theory, as well as current clinical views regarding interpretation and the role of the transference/countertransference relationship in analysis, all of which should be brought to bear upon the process of reconstruction. My view is that the activity of reconstruction in analysis has an archetypal basis in the healing process and that "personal history" is infiltrated by archetypal elements. The Jungian contribution to reconstruction lies precisely in this sense of the deeper background processes active both in the activity of analytical reconstruction and in the lineaments of personal fate as they appear in the story that is gathered and told in analysis.

I want to acknowledge Kenneth Lambert's sensitively balanced account of reconstruction in his book *Analysis, Repair and Individuation*, in which he reviews the literature of psychoanalysis and analytical psychology on this subject and makes judicious comments. His work helped me gain the courage to write this paper, for reconstruction is not exactly a "Jungian topic." The term is used largely only in classical psychoanalysis, and yet, as Lambert points out, Jung himself produced "what amounts

to a massive reconstruction of the Hebrew-Christian psycho-cultural tradition" in the last two decades of his life (p. 117). Independently I have argued this same point and detailed it in my book *Jung's Treatment of Christianity: The Psychotherapy of a Religious Tradition*. My examination of reconstruction here fills in more detail by focusing particularly on the archetypal elements of reconstruction. Lambert does not emphasize these, but I do not believe he would object to my specification of them.

Lambert raises a question that needs to be considered. He points out that reconstruction is generally done by analysts of a particular temperament (p. 113). He does not name which temperament it might be, but one supposes he is referring to analysts who work largely with the thinking and/or feeling functions. These are analysts, he says, with "a sense of history" and an interest in the social and cultural background of their patients. I would like to carry this a step further by noting that it may also be the analyst's countertransference attitude, not only or primarily his temperament, that plays a role in the activity of reconstruction.

This "attitude," which I have described (1984 pp. 85-87) as a persistent set of perspectives, ideas, and feelings already in place at the beginning of analysis and continuing throughout the course of it, perhaps being interrupted occasionally by countertransference "reactions" or longer-lasting "phases," is itself archetypally based; it reflects an archetypal pattern. In considering the role of archetypes in reconstruction, therefore, we need to consider also the archetypal constellation that underlies the countertransference attitude that is involved in the very act of doing this activity. Is there an aspect of the healing archetype that, in the case of psychotherapy, leads to the activity of reconstruction? Or do various archetypal patterns influence the analyst's consciousness as the task of reconstruction is performed? Perhaps both situations obtain. In the first instance, the idea of history has come to hold a firm and established place in the therapist's attitude: There is the predisposition to see bits of data as embedded in patterns of historical evolution and development. In the second instance, there are more specific features, such as fantasies of mothering and feeding in the countertransference, which govern the way in which historical patterns are divulged and experienced by the analyst (cf. Fordham 1978, pp. 125-28), or an erotic father-daughter incest pattern, which occurs in the countertransference and is used for reconstructive purposes (Schwartz-Salant, 1986, pp. 41ff).

In speaking about archetypal dimensions of reconstruction, therefore, I am speaking of several different things: the archetypal basis of processing data historically, archetypal features of the act of remembering, archetypal elements within the remembered events of one's personal

history, and archetypal elements in countertransference feeling and imagery that can be used for reconstruction. All of these dimensions have a place in reconstruction. The remainder of this article will examine them, with the caveat that these four aspects cannot be cleanly separated and held distinct.

On the Archetypal Basis of Thinking Historically

Is there an archetypal basis for the activity of reconstruction in analysis? If so, what is it, and what is the evidence for its existence?

One basis for claiming archetypality for any human activity is its ubiquity. Historical thinking is ancient and, so far as I can discover, universal. Every human group seems to have a story of its origins and history. Generally the origin is situated *in illo tempore* (Eliade), in a mythical creation event, a "big bang" from which history unfolds (for examples, see von Franz's *Creation Myths*). In the Biblical tradition, prehistory is occupied by God and His brooding over the waters of chaos; He creates the heavens and the earth, humans, the garden, and history begins from there. Rome's history begins with the myth of being founded by the orphans, Romulus and Remus. American history begins in a myth of revolution against the parent country. The story of the nation or of the tribe then follows, and the various significant human and divine figures are recalled by the historian in detail as they appear on the stage of history and influence the historical process. Historians remember the story.

"History" derives from the Greek adjective *hístōr*, meaning "knowing, hence erudite, itself an agent . . . from *eidenai* . . . to know" (Partridge 1966, p. 289). At the root is *weid-*, "connoting vision, which subserves knowledge; cf. Gr *eidōs*, form . . . akin to Skt *vedas-*, knowledge" (*ibid.*). The knowing, erudite ones, the original historians, were poets and storytellers who could remember history back to the very walls of Troy or to the days of the patriarchs, all the way back to the mythic source of history itself, and could then come forward into the present—if one could stay awake long enough to hear the whole account. This was not scientific history in the modern sense, but it was equally based on the human urge to know a history. The "idea of history" was at work in an archaic way in the minds of these early historians.

After the storytellers came the historians proper—Biblical, Greek, and Indian. Every nation and tribe, including our own American nation, our own Jungian tribe, as well as our individual families, has a history. It is a broken group indeed that has lost its story. The same is true of individuals.

There is another type of evidence of the archetypality of thinking historically. It appears that a historical record is kept by the unconscious quite independently of conscious intent. One of the original insights of psychoanalysis was that the mind does not simply erase the past. One may repress a memory trace, or temporarily forget or screen it out of awareness, but events are not normally lost. They are deposited in the unconscious. The "memory bank" is only partially conscious; much of it is unconscious.

There is a strand of thinking in Jung's work that holds that the unconscious is not bound to the Kantian categories of space and time. In the unconscious, Jung often said, time does not exist as it does in consciousness. Past and future are not arranged sequentially, and therefore it is possible to have "precognitive dreams," for example, which are messages from the unconscious that indicate knowledge of events ahead of time. Beside this description of unconscious processes, however, is the equally important (though less developed in relation to clinical practice) idea that the unconscious keeps a historical record and anticipates events because it has a time-keeping device within it. This time-keeper in the unconscious has a sense of historical pattern and duration, a sense of how long things should take. This may be similar to the notion of circadian rhythms or bio-rhythms, but it is more "cognitive" than those concepts. It is time-consciousness folded into the unconscious.

Jung gives an example of this in reference to a case that he alludes to in "The Psychology of the Transference." He says that when the transference is initiated, "a queer unconscious time-reckoning, lasting for months or even longer" begins (1946, par. 376). The example he cites is from the dreams of a sixty-year-old woman patient who was having dreams of a baby, "a child hero or divine child" (par. 378). At the time of the dreams, this child was six months old. Upon investigation, it turned out that six months earlier the analysand had had a birth dream. Nine months before that she had painted a picture of "a naked female figure from whose genital region [a serpent] rears up towards the heart, where it burst into a five-pointed, gorgeously flashing golden star" (par. 380). Jung comments:

The serpent represents the hissing ascent of Kundalini, and in the corresponding yoga this marks the first moment in a process which ends with deification in the divine Self, the syzygy of Shiva and Shakti. It is obviously the moment of symbolical conception. . . . (par. 380)

This whole sequence of conception, birth, and growth had occurred spontaneously in the unconscious and had unfolded in a time frame that

matched that of actual historical time. The unconscious was keeping time.

A similar example of unconscious time-reckoning occurred recently in my practice, though not directly in my analysand's psyche. The sixteen-year-old daughter of my analysand had a secret abortion in early summer, which she confessed to her parents in August. In September she returned to school and was doing quite well until late October, when she developed a peculiar and undiagnosable malady. She consistently ran a temperature of 100° F., which did not respond to medical treatment. As a result she could not go to school. The parents took her to the best diagnosticians in the city, and none could find evidence of disease. Everything was tried, to no avail, and she was forced to stay at home, mostly in bed. The theory was that the fever was caused by a pelvic infection and that it was located in the reproductive organs, but no evidence could be found. She stayed in bed from October onward. In mid-February a new doctor decided it was time for exploratory surgery. This was done, and the girl responded poorly, having to be hospitalized for two days rather than overnight. She came home, took a week to recover, but then developed a case of common flu. This disappeared in a week, and with it all signs of illness. There was no more fever, and she returned to school. The doctors had found no evidence of disease in the exploratory surgery. The peculiar coincidence was that the operation and hospitalization took place exactly nine months after the conception of her baby, just when she would have been going into the hospital to give birth. It was as though the unconscious had kept time, knew it was now time to release her from her pelvic distress, and recognized the surgery as equivalent to birth.

Anecdotes such as these do not prove the existence of a time-keeping function in the unconscious, but they do strongly suggest this to be the case. It is this psychic factor, I would guess, that is at the root of the pervasive human tendency to think historically in a conscious way.

It is important to make this point about the archetypal basis of reconstruction, because otherwise it could appear that it is merely the "times," and the peculiar modern bent toward historicism, that has captured the minds of therapists as well as of educated persons in our culture generally. Historical thinking in academic life has certainly flowered in the last several centuries. The 19th century saw a great burgeoning of it, and our own century has continued the tradition. This tendency toward historicism in the intellectual community has produced great stress and conflict because of the ways in which secular historians have interpreted history and the kinds of "facts" they will accept as valid. The basic conflict has been joined between the mythic, religious thinkers on the

one side and the scientific, empirical thinkers on the other. For the former, history is grounded in and profoundly shaped by divine interventions; for the latter, such mythic elements need to be ferreted out of the historical record. The debate has not been so much about whether or not history is important or should be pursued as an intellectual discipline, but what can be counted as a "fact." The same argument can be transposed to the psychological and clinical level. Almost everyone would agree that history and development are molar ideas in psychology and in the practice of psychotherapy, but not all would agree on what counts as valid data. Should important dreams be included in the developmental story? Or synchronistic events? Or should one count only the normal unfolding of a developmental sequence and the influences of the environment? The conflict between views of history and what makes history could be as intense in psychological circles as it has been in philosophical and theological ones.

Jung broadened the idea of history in its application to clinical practice. Included in the analysand's history are not only childhood and the immediate family, but also the much larger matrix of culture, of generational patterns, and of archaic history as this is embedded in the collective unconscious. Jung's interpretation of history and his account of psychological development includes the personal dynamics of identification, introjection, *participation mystique*, complex formation, and also the archetypal dynamics of constellation, synchronicity, and spontaneous influences from beyond the horizon of external factors. If anything, Jung is a more rigorous and consistent historian than most other clinical theorists, because he recognizes the individual's life to be deeply formed by these many factors, all of which play a part in development. Jung's inclusion of archetypes within the historical nexus leads to the realization that the influence of history upon the individual is ubiquitous, rooted in culture and the unconscious, pervasive through all segments of emotional and mental functioning, and fundamental to identity. For this reason he warns of the danger of departing too far from one's personal and cultural roots.

This understanding of the importance of history in the life of the individual would seem to give the Jungian analyst a particularly keen appreciation of the importance of reconstruction in clinical work. Reconstruction would seem to be a key part of becoming conscious of oneself. But this has not always been the case, because the value of archetypal depth in the healing process has sometimes been contrasted to the superficiality or intellectuality of historical understanding. It has not been clearly enough stated that historical consciousness rests upon an archety-

pal base, and that the clinical work of reconstruction functions to connect the analysand to that archetypal process within. Reconstruction is truly healing because it restores consciousness to an archetypal base. Its healing power derives not only from the benefit of attaining a sense of one's own history, and thereby gaining an identity, but equally from the healing effects of historical reflection, of re-membering one's wholeness.

On Jung's Use of Reconstruction in Clinical Practice

One reason many readers come away from Jung's *Collected Works* with the impression that he did little reconstruction in analysis and that he preferred to amplify archetypal aspects of his patient's dreams and unconscious contents is that he spends so few pages actually detailing his analytic cases. I am convinced that if he had written up his cases, the surprise would be the importance of personal history in them. One reason I am confident of this is that in the several cases he does describe, the personal historical details that are uncovered are *always* critical for understanding the "case" and its outcome. I will cite only three such instances.

The earliest case (1961, pp. 115-17; 1935, pars. 107-108) derives from the time of his residency at the Burghölzli Klinik in Zürich. A woman was admitted to the hospital and diagnosed as schizophrenic. Jung disagreed and thought it was a reactive depression. By using the word-association test and analyzing her dreams, he discovered her story: She had unconsciously, but willfully nonetheless, killed her child by giving it unclean water to drink. The reconstruction of this piece of repressed personal history led to a full recovery, according to Jung, and constituted the whole of her treatment.

The second case is of a young Jewish woman with an anxiety neurosis (1939, pars. 635-36). Jung recounts that she had been in analysis before, and the analyst had fallen in love with her. The treatment had failed to relieve her symptoms or to cure her mental anguish. Jung says that he dreamed of her the night before he met her and realized in the dream that she had a "father complex." When he interviewed her, however, he could find little evidence of this problem, so he dug further into her history and found that she was the granddaughter of a Hasidic wonder-working rabbi. This bit of personal history proved to be the key to a cure. Jung told her, "Look here . . . you have been untrue to your God. Your grandfather led the right life, but you are worse than a heretic; you have forsaken the mystery of your race. You belong to holy people." Upon hearing this she was able to accept her Jewishness and her religious identity, and within one week the anxiety neurosis was cured (par. 636).

In this instance, the reconstruction of family history led not only to a stronger sense of personal identity but also to realizing the symbolic, religious proclivity and need of the psyche. The appropriation of personal history and admission to the archetypal psyche happened in one and the same psychic event. Again, reconstruction represented the key to therapeutic healing.

A third case reported by Jung is more extensive. He refers to it several times in the *Collected Works* (1942, par. 189; 1950, pars. 656ff.; 1937, pars. 546–63; 1935, pars. 334–337), as well as in the Kundalini Seminar (Autumn 1932, pp. 91ff.). This is the case of a young woman who spent her childhood in Java. She was 25 years old when Jung began to see her. Jung was her third analyst, the former two treatments having ended in impasse and failure. In the course of his treatment of her, Jung reports, he was at first put off by her vulgar persona and then extremely puzzled by the physical symptoms she developed in the course of their work together. He was ultimately able to amplify these physical maladies by using kundalini yoga's chakra system, which he discovered independently in the course of this treatment. His extensive knowledge of the historical details of this person's life and his evaluation of their central importance in her psychology (cf. 1937, pars. 546–63) make it extremely evident that he did a great deal of reconstruction of her early years, particularly of her childhood in Java and the relationship she developed with a Javanese *ayab*, a nanny or native nurse. Jung was able to understand her bizarre dream images and physical symptoms, and to explain their meaning to her, because he could relate her Javanese childhood to the symbol system of tantric yoga. Treatment broke off, he says, when she reached the manipura center and experienced a bird descending and piercing through the fontanelle to the diaphragm. At this point she realized she wanted to have a child, literally, and gave up psychological treatment without explanation. A year later she returned to Jung and explained why she had abruptly stopped treatment; he, in turn, was able to amplify her motives by using tantric philosophy.

This little bit of Tantric philosophy helped that patient to make an ordinary human life for herself, as a wife and mother, out of the local demonology she had sucked in with her *ayab's* milk, and to do so without losing touch with the inner, psychic figures which had been called awake by the long-forgotten influences of her childhood. What she experienced as a child, and what later estranged her from the European consciousness and entangled her in a neurosis, was, with the help of analysis, transformed not into nebulous fantasies but into a lasting spiritual possession in no way incompatible with an ordinary human existence, a husband, children, and housewifely duties. (Jung 1937, par. 563)

This paragraph, as clearly as any single passage in Jung's written works, illustrates the intimate blending of personal and archetypal factors in his method of reconstruction. The personal elements and the archetypal ones are seen as making up a whole, and they are held closely together in the fabric of a person's history.

Others of Jung's cases could be cited to make the same point. In practice, the line of demarcation between personal and archetypal aspects in the personality is much less straight than it sometimes is made to seem in theory. And historical reconstruction is deeply woven into the process of analysis, alongside the other aspects of treatment. More than that, the product of reconstruction—the history—often occupies the center of clinical treatment, forming a kind of center pole that supports the whole analytic edifice.

Clinical Applications

It is sometimes supposed that the strength of Jungian analysts lies in our ability to see things archetypally. Give us a grain of sand and we'll find a world in it. Indeed, one of the current understandings of what the term "archetypal" means is that it has to do with a way of seeing: "archetypal" is an attribute of the eye of the beholder (Samuels 1985), or a term used to indicate the great importance of something (Hillman 1983). Jungians are supposed to have archetypally oriented eyes. The problem with this usage of the term archetypal is that it sacrifices the connection to the underlying reality of archetypes, like paper money that is no longer related to real property. Consequently the term can become inflated, devalued, and meaningless.

The more usual Jungian usage is that "archetypal" means that a psychic fact—an image, a dream, an idea, a perception, or a pattern of behavior—reflects an archetype, which is a structure that is deeply rooted in the psychic matrix that can be regarded as generally human and innate, and that is basic to human *qua* human functioning. Archetypes, Jung would say, are the basic building blocks of the psyche. The trained clinical eye can see these elemental forms in the welter of facts presented by a patient, can see the basic patterns and the deeper than manifest meanings. The truly trained eye, the true clinical imagination, can see that "all events are echoes" of universal themes (Davenport 1984), but that which is recognized is not a resident solely of the trained eye. Beyond the surface, the eye is *seeing something*.

The surface behind which one sees in analysis may be the analysand's life story. The clinician with an eye trained to perceive archety-

pal factors at work in the analysand's history may reverse the background/foreground fields, perhaps thus missing some detail but looking more deeply into the underlying patterns that have organized the details in a person's life. In the background one can see evidence of archetypal dynamic/developmental themes, individuation phases and their typical movements through time: the constellation of the puer, the hero, the romance with the father, the *coniunctio*, the death and rebirth motif. One can also find the typical archetypal "figures" in personal history: mother, father, child, hero, witch, trickster, clown, anima/animus, wise old ones. Gazing into "background" has the feeling of studying life's fate.

The activity of reconstructing history in analysis can be carried out on a completely personal basis: this mother, this father, this set of siblings, this school, etc. The result will be a complete set of facts, a story, but it will not include the fatedness of this life to be this way and not that. It is recollection, but it has little therapeutic value. It will miss the spiritual purpose of this life and its meaning. It will also miss its deepest suffering, such as was experienced by a 50-year-old woman who, racked with sobs and outrage, whispered through her hot tears: "When I was seven years old and my mother gave me that doll with my sister's dress on it, I *knew* I would never have children and she would. This is my *fate*." The therapist feels inclined to look away from such finality, but a chord of truth is struck.

The sensitive therapist shudders at the thought of such finality and limitation. Are we not in the business of helping people to change, to grow, to become what they are not and want to be? If we look for archetypal patterns, though, we come upon limits, sometimes cruel destinies, but also sometimes inexplicable charm and good luck. It doesn't always seem fair. "The doctor knows that always, wherever he turns, man is dogged by his fate," writes Jung in his seventies (1946, par. 463).

I once worked in analysis with a young man whose presenting problem was intense jealousy. He felt that his beautiful girlfriend was always looking at other young men in their high school class and secretly hoped he would get lost. Despite much reassurance from her, his gloomy thoughts persisted. We began by looking at his dreams and putting together his history and trying to understand his thinking, which he often confessed was bizarre and out of his rational control.

After a few months we had assembled the main features of his story. He was the only child of a couple in which the mother felt far superior to the father, a common worker. The mother doted on her son, and he grew up feeling special. At an early age, however, he had been sent to the country to live with grandparents because his mother had to return to

work and didn't have time to care for a small child. So until he was old enough to enter primary school, he lived several hours away and saw his parents on weekends when they came to visit him. This absence increased the intensity of the bond, but also created feelings of abandonment and lack of worth. As he grew, he became much more closely identified with his mother than his father. She was musical, poetic, artistic, as he was, while his father was seen by them both as gross and uneducated. His father favored rough sports like football and wished the son were more athletic. By the time I saw him, he had decided to become a high school teacher. He enjoyed writing and painting; his particular pleasure was sculpture.

At one point he had written a poem in which he expressed his feelings of inferiority by depicting himself as a hunchback who lived underground. He was despised by passers-by, and occasionally they would spit on him. He felt that his body was "too thick" and often wished that he were more slender and small in build. He felt particularly oversized in his chest, upper torso, and hips. He felt womanish and unmasculine, rejected by "real men" like his father.

One night as he was sitting at the desk in his atelier dwelling on his jealous thoughts, he looked at his leg and noticed it had turned blue from the foot to an area above the ankle. Greatly upset, he got up and went over to his bed. As he sat there he saw footprints moving across the carpet and thought they might be his father's. Then the vision passed and his foot returned to normal. This highly disturbing experience brought him into therapy with me. He had no other such experiences, and a physical examination had revealed nothing of concern.

Some months after therapy began, he took a brief holiday in the mountains by himself. His girlfriend had gone on a school trip to another city. While camping out, he dreamed that she was having an affair with a young man in the city she was visiting. This dream, which was a nightmare, occurred during a thunderstorm, and he awoke in a panic.

After all of these details had been set out, it occurred to me one day in a session that there were elements of his story that reminded me of the Greek god Hephaestus. He was cast out of heaven shortly after birth, and crippled in the foot. He was a craftsman and sculptor, scoffed at by the other gods for his physical awkwardness, and betrayed by his beautiful wife Aphrodite, who went to bed with his half-brother Ares. I mentioned this association and told him I didn't know much about Hephaestus, which was true at the time, but since he was interested in myth he could look it up and get some more information on his own.

In the next session he told me that he had indeed looked up every-

thing he could on Hephaestus, and that he was stangely moved by this figure. In fact, he had been so taken by the stories about this god that he had shared some of them with his girlfriend over the weekend. When he came to the story of Hephaestus discovering Aphrodite in bed with Ares, he began to weep. Surprisingly, his girlfriend also began to cry, and she confessed that she had indeed had a sexual encounter with a young man during her school holidays. As it turned out, the timing of it coincided precisely with his dream during the thunderstorm on the mountain. This confession had actually relieved him a great deal, because he now knew he wasn't just crazy. His girlfriend was unreliable sexually, and it was better to know this than to keep wondering about it.

It would be preposterous to claim that this amplification of certain facts in his life history and experience with the Hephaestus myth cured him completely of his jealousy. The roots of his jealousy were fed by deep and persistent forces in his psyche. His self-esteem was certainly improved by this association, however, and the wider context of meaning supplied by the myth helped him place his life experience into the context of an archetypal pattern. The sense of deeper pattern for the crippled craftsman that he was provided a redeeming frame of reference. It also gave us a direction to work toward in therapy. There is a good deal of strength and potential for life in the Hephaestian character, but this sense of archetypal pattern also brings awareness of limitations: Hephaestus will never be Hermes, or Zeus, or Apollo. He will always have to struggle with lameness, with fears of rejection, with vulnerability to threats of abandonment. Reflecting later on this case, and eventually writing a paper about it (1980), it occurred to me that this pattern is fairly typical of young men who are innately introverted, who become artistic and creative, and who have suffered an early experience of parental abandonment. Their salvation lies in staying true to their introversion, to their creative vocation, and to their capacity for eventually filling themselves out as husbands and fathers, as Hephaestus does after his failure with Aphrodite.

The discovery of a mythic pattern in this case was important as an orientation device. It also reassured us that beneath all the facts of this particular history an archetype was operative. This meant we could have faith in history's unfolding.

If Jungian analysts are reputed to be able to find worlds in a grain of sand and to perceive archetypal patterns in the data of a person's history, they are less well known for doing the reverse of this, i.e., finding the personal, historical element in an obviously archetypal image or fantasy. Yet, clinically, this is at least as crucial as the other skill.

Satinover (1985) made the astute observation that archetypal figures are often presented when psychic compensation is taking place in areas of failed adaptation or unresolved trauma. He compared the activation of an archetypal fantasy image and its role in restoring a person to quasi-healthy functioning to the way a weak heart compensates for its malfunctioning: It becomes enlarged and thereby manages to keep blood flowing. But this is not a healthy heart. So, he argued, archetypal figures move into consciousness when the ego is impaired inherently or by circumstance and otherwise would not be able to continue functioning adaptively. Satinover's advice is always to look for personal complexes where archetypal images or behaviors appear.

Jung himself made a similar point in 1946 with regard to his theory of complexes and archetypes. Jung observed that when experiences and familiar figures become enveloped in a fold of unconsciousness, they are assimilated by the complexes. If they are kept unconscious long enough, they eventually come into contact with the archetypes. When this happens, the complexes

assume, by self-amplification, an archaic and mythological character and hence a certain numinosity, as is perfectly clear in schizophrenic dissociations. Numinosity, however, is wholly outside conscious volition, for it transports the subject into the state of rapture, which is a state of will-less surrender. . . . These peculiarities of the unconscious state contrast very strongly with the way complexes behave in the conscious mind. Here they can be corrected: they lose their automatic character and can be substantially transformed. They slough off their mythological envelope, and, by entering into the adaptive process going forward in consciousness, they personalize and rationalize themselves to the point where a dialectical discussion becomes possible. (1954, pars. 383-84)

In a footnote he adds: "In schizophrenic dissociation there is no such change in the conscious state, because the complexes are received not into a complete but into a fragmentary consciousness. That is why they so often appear in the original archaic state" (*Ibid.*, p. 187, n. 48).

From this it follows that the clinical picture presented by the analysand who seems to have little sense of personal history but comes fully packed with big dreams and archetypal images should alert the analyst to rather severe trauma and damage in the area of personal history. Instead of speaking about father and mother, this analysand speaks of the king and queen; instead of presenting a continuous narrative of personal history and development, this person tells of radical transformations and a disjunctive series of vaguely perceived happenings; instead of identity, there is protean change among a number of stereotypes and personas.

The task of analysis here is to find the grains of sand in these archetypal worlds.

For this kind of an analysis, the painstaking work of careful reconstruction of personal history is particularly essential. The greatest obstacle lies in the astonishing lack of a continuous memory. Much of the detail must be collected, therefore, through transference interpretations, and this always leaves things a bit speculative. The work of finding an inner history, which tells the emotional story of this person's life experience, is slow and tenuous. If successful, the "mythological envelope" is gradually opened and the personal story, along with the feelings, come forth.

I once began treating a woman of this type. Her father had just died, and there was no relevant affect. Instead I was presented with many ideas and images. The dreams, too, were immense, archetypal, otherworldly. This woman could exist in a psychic wonderland while her personal life was a disaster. She was not schizophrenic, but was perhaps occasionally a bit psychotic, in the sense of being flooded and overwhelmed with archetypal contents. She did not hallucinate, but she had a vivid imagination and minimal impulse control. While she could speak fluently and easily about her dreams and ideas, she spoke about her personal life and history only haltingly, surprised that anyone would care to talk about that. Philosophy, ideas, myths and images—that's where the action was. We made little headway in the brief time I saw her, and I had to refer her elsewhere when I moved to another city. She continued in therapy with a psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapist, and when I met her again some eight years later I could scarcely recognize her, psychologically speaking. She was emotionally connected, she was personal, she could speak of her feelings for her family and her children, she was a devoted mother. She was completely transformed. I asked about her analysis, and she told me that it had been entirely based on transference interpretation and reconstruction of early childhood. Dreams had hardly been discussed, archetypes never mentioned, philosophy shunned as a defense against personal feelings in the present. She was grounded; she had a history; she had an identity as a woman. I was impressed.

I did not say, but nonetheless thought: This whole development was promised in the earlier dreams, but symbolically. The archetypal dreams showed that potential intactness, wholeness, and identity were there, but personal history was all shadow, all unconsciousness, and only after this had been integrated into consciousness could wholeness shine through. Integrating personal history in the transference had grounded her and provided a conscious identity. The archetypal dreams had indicated this

possibility, while at the same time they had covered and hidden the very detail of history she needed to become a person.

If one tries to live the "symbolic life" before personal history has been woven tightly and intractably into consciousness, it is likely to be a false life. The archetypal end of the psychic spectrum crowds out both the instinctual and the personal aspects, and the ego uses these symbolic contents defensively, to block the rest out. This type of ego-consciousness tends to fear the pain of "reductionism" and of thereby losing the sense of specialness. For the narcissistic character, the symbolic life is a defense and not a real possibility. The symbolic dimension can be contained adequately only by an ego-consciousness that is itself personally integrated. The personal must precede the impersonal.

Jung's point that what falls out of consciousness becomes assimilated to unconscious content and re-appears as archetypal image leads us clinically to look for historical reality in archetypal idea and image. When the historical figure is retrieved from the archetype—a personal mother from the witch archetype, for example, or a father from the bull—personal relationships become unburdened of the weight of archetypal projections and the ego is freed to experience life less delusionally. The archetypes too are freed of the burden of the personal, and this allows these "psychic organs" (Jung 1940, par. 271) to function in a new way. The pathway to the symbolic is cleared.

I will turn now to a third analytic move. The first is finding an archetypal pattern beneath the welter of historical detail. Here we feel we are studying the outlines of personal fate. The second is finding historical detail in a welter of archetypal images and helping consciousness to integrate and to consolidate personal identity. The third move is to see where the personal/historical and the archetypal elements are joined, either because of an archetypal "intervention" in history (synchronicity), or through the effective union of personal and archetypal data and figures such that personal history takes on the feeling of religious meaning and destiny. This is a level of reconstruction that attempts to hold the personal and the archetypal dimensions of history together in a single vision. This is a *mysterium coniunctionis* at the level of history.

Jung quotes the *Rosarium*:

Whiten the lato and rend the books lest your hearts be rent asunder. For this is the synthesis of the wise and third part of the whole *opus*. Join therefore, as is said in the *Turba*, the dry to the moist, the black earth with its water, and cook till it whitens. In this manner you will have the essence of water and earth, having whitened the earth with water: but that whiteness is called air. (1946, par. 484)

This summarizes, symbolically, the operation I am speaking of here, where the personal aspects of one's history (the "lato," a black substance) are given the fullness of analytic attention (the "water," which is the divine gift of illumination) until that history lifts from the concrete to the symbolic (the "whiteness," the "air") and personal and archetypal elements become united. This is the stage of the *opus* referred to by Jung as "Purification," and is accompanied by the lines:

Here falls the heavenly dew to lave
The soiled black body in the grave. (1946, p. 273)

Religious thinkers have developed the idea of a "sacred history," a *Heilsgeschichte* ("salvation-history"), to speak about the inner story of how a people has been chosen, formed, given a vocation and a meaning on the stage of world history, received a sense of destiny. This is the "inner history" of religious communities (Niebuhr 1960), the story of how God has guided, intervened, tended, driven, criticized, and blessed them. It is quite different from the "outer history" as written by noninvolved, dispassionate, objective or academic historians. An inner history is the story of meaning, in which time and eternity, consciousness and unconsciousness, specific historical and archetypal forces all together perform their roles and produce a particular configuration in time. To be totally inside such a history is to be quite unconscious and ignorant of other historical trends, of objective history. To be totally outside of any such history, however, is to be unconscious and ignorant of transcendent factors at play within the historical process. Traditional persons live wholly inside such a sacred history; modern persons live wholly outside; post-modern persons, such as Jung was, dwell both inside and outside, carrying the tension of these opposing perspectives in a single paradoxical vision (cf. Harvey 1966).

In analysis these three stages may also be traversed, at least to some extent. The psychological beginner is wholly enclosed in conscious subjectivity, and the objectivity of the unconscious and its influence is completely unknown. Analysis brings about some measure of awareness of this "other" within, an objective psychic reality made up of complexes and archetypes, which dwells alongside conscious subjectivity and impinges on it in innumerable ways. Analysis seeks to achieve some detachment from one's own biases and perspectives and limited history. This is generally what it means to be "analyzed." But can analysis also take the third step? This would occur when in the course of reconstruction and remembering the personal and impersonal past, subjective and objective elements would fuse in such a way that both remained in consciousness.

Archetypal elements would not be used to obliterate personal ones or get placed in the service of the ego-defenses, nor would the personal elements obscure and hide the archetypal ones. Both would appear and be held in consciousness simultaneously. In this instance, the symbolic becomes personal, and the personal is symbolic.

The brief but extremely powerful and far-reaching experience of a particular man illustrates this. He was in his early 40s. His father, a minister, had died some years previously. In church one Sunday he became extremely emotional and felt the memory of his father pressing in on him. For the first time, the presence of God and the presence of his father-image were joined consciously in his mind. Suddenly he had the vivid thought/image that when he died and went to heaven and looked into the face of God, he would look into the face of his father.

In this experience we find the marriage of the personal and the archetypal. This man was otherwise well-grounded in a personal history and had done a good bit of reconstructive work in analysis. His father had been a present and immediate figure in his life, and the two of them had gone through the usual oedipal struggles. After the death of his father he had both assimilated him to his ego and had allowed his image to fall into the unconscious, where it became assimilated to the father archetype. In this moment of religious experience and insight, the image of his father reappeared as a fused personal/archetypal figure, and this would provide the key for reinterpreting his history. Now, looking back, he could see that the father archetype had been embodied and had acted in his personal history through his own actual father. For this man now to say that God acts in history was to say that he could understand the relationship with his father in archetypal terms.

It also happened that his father was a Yahweh-like, emotional, claim-making figure (Jung 1952, par. 568) and also the self-sacrificing God of love. This confluence of personal and archetypal father elements allowed this man to *feel* the action of the Biblical God in his own life, through the person of his father. A part of his "inner history" would have to be perceived in this way. At the same time, he retained a clear grasp of the actuality of the man who was his father. The two images remained in consciousness side-by-side.

Jung's woman patient with the Javanese childhood runs along similar lines. There is a synchronistic confluence between an archetypal process and a personal history, and this is uncovered and understood and accepted in the reconstructive work of analysis.

The final psychic product of the stage of reconstruction I am de-

scribing here is *amor fati*: not only knowledge about one's history, nor even the more intimate knowledge of it, but a full embrace and love of it, as that which has been archetypally meant to be.

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